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Notes and Comment
Constitutional Law: Constitutionality of Bulk Sales Statutes.-The
Bulk Sales Law is the subject of a decision recently handed down by
Justice Van Siclen in the case of Klein v. Marvelas, 94 Misc. (N. Y.)
458 (rpi6). This decision declares the statute unconstitutional,
and, in view of the fact that it had just been declared constitutional
by another branch of the Supreme Court in the case of Apex Leasing
Co. v. Litke and Litke Stores, Inc.1, the status of the law is left in
much doubt.
The first bulk sales statute passed in New York2 made the sale of
merchandise in bulk fraudulent and void as against creditors unless
certain prescribed conditions were complied with. These conditions
were that the seller and purchaser, at least five days before the sale:
(i) make an inventory showing the quantity and, so far as possible,
the cost price of each article to be included in the sale; (2) send notice
to the seller's creditors of the proposed sale, of the stated cost price
of the merchandise, and the price to be paid for the same by the
purchaser; (3) file a truthful answer to the inquiries as to the
above information. This statute was construed in the case of
Wright v. Hart' and declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it
was class legislation and that it was in contravention of the due
process clause. This statute was amended in ig4 by declaring
such sales presumptively void and exempting from its operation
executors, administrators, receivers, and public officers conducting
a sale in his official capacity. This amended statute was declared
constitutional as merely creating a rule of evidence. In 9o75 a third
act was passed which was similar in substance to the act of 1904.
This statute remained in force until 1914 when the present statute
was passed. The present statute is similar to the original statute in
that it makes the sale void if the conditions are not performed.
The conditions are practically the same as in the original statute,
except that this statute does not require a filing of the answers to the
inquiries of the law as was required in the original statute and exempts
from its operation general assignments made for the benefit of
creditors, and sales by executors, administrators, receivers, trustees
in bankruptcy, assignees under a voluntary assignment for the ben-
efit of creditors, or any public officer under judicial process.
Similar statutes regulating the sale of goods in bulk have been
passed in forty-five states7 and it is significant that in all the litigation
193 Misc. (N. Y.) 353 (1916).2Laws of 1902, chap. 528.2182 N. Y. 330 (1905).
'Laws of 1904, chap. 569.
"Laws of 1907, chap. 722.
6Laws of 1914, chap. 507.7Arizona, Laws of i909, chap. 47; Arkansas, Acts of 19r3, Act 88, p. 326;
California, Act of Mar. 10, 1903, amending sec. 3440 of the Civil Code; Colorado
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arising therefrom only five cases have been found declaring the
statutes unconstitutional.8 The great majority of states, on the
other hand, have declared such statutes constitutional. 9 It has been
submitted by some writers on the subject that, although the statutes
creating a rule of evidence, making the sale presumptively void,
should be declared constitutional, the statutes making the sale
void, if the conditions were not performed, are unconstitutional.
This distinction would not seem to be based upon sound principle
since in many cases the courts have declared "presumptively
void" to mean"conclusivelypresumed to be void", and thus the same
Laws of 19o3, chap. 11o; Connecticut, General Statutes sees 4867-4869; Dela-
ware, Laws of 1903, chap. 387; Dist. of Columbia, U. S. Statutes at Large,
58th Cong., chap. i8o9; Florida, Act of May 27, 1907; Georgia, Laws of i9o3,
No. 457; Idaho, Acts 1903, p. 11-12; Illinois, Acts 1905, p. 284; Indiana, Acts
1909, p. 122; Iowa, Supplemental Supplement, Code of Iowa (1915) sec. 2911a;
Kentucky Acts, 1904, chap. 22; Louisiana, Acts 1896, No. 94; Maine, Acts
x9o5, p. ii9; Maryland, Laws 19o8, chap. 704; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves
19o3, chap. 4Is; Michigan, Acts 1905, No. 223; Minnesota, Rev. Laws, see.
3503; Mississippi, Act of Mar. 6, 19o8; Montana, Act of Mar. 7, 1907; Nebraska,
Act of Mar. 4, i9o7; Nevada, Rev. Laws (1912), sec. 39o8; New Hampshire,
Public Statutes, chap. 273, following sec. io: New Jersey, Acts of 1907, chap.
237; New Mexico, Laws i915, chap. 22; New York, Laws 1914, chap. 507;
North Carolina, Laws 1907, chap. 623; North Dakota, Civil Code, sec. 7224;
Ohio, Act of Apr. 3o, i9o8; Oklahoma, Act of May 26, 19o8; Oregon, Ann.
Codes and Statutes (1902), secs. 4623-4626; Pennsylvania, Acts igo5, No. 44,
p. 62; Rhode Island, Laws I909, chap. 387; South Carolina, Acts 19o6, p. I;
South Dakota, Laws 1913, chap. 116; Tennessee, Acts 19o, chap. 133; Texas,
Act of Mar. I. i9o9; Utah, Comp. Laws (1907), title 71, secs. 2o63x-2o63x4;
Vermont, Public Statutes (igo6), chap. 216; Virginia, Code (1904), sec. 246oa;
Washington, Laws 19o1, chap. io9; West Virginia, Acts 19o9, chap. 78; Wiscon-
sin, Laws i9oI, chap. 463;80ff and Company v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40 (19o8); this case is exceptional
inasmuch the statute merely declared the sale presumptively void. Wright
v. Hart, X82 N. Y. 332 (1905). Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387 (i9o4); the
statute here made a sale without compliance with its provisions a mis-
demeanor. McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671 (1904); the act construed
in this case excluded from the benefit of the act all creditors except
merchants, and this classification was held too narrow; the act was amended
and held constitutional in Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. I (1912).
Miller v. Crawford, 70 Ohio State 207 (1904); decision went on ground
that it was class legislation being confined to merchants; this case was
followed in Williams v. Preslo, 84 Ohio St. 328 (IgIO).9Walp v. Mooar, 76 Conn. 515 (1904); Goldstein v. Maloney, 62 Fla. 198(19xi); Jaques Tinsley Co. v. Carstarphen Co, 13i Ga. i (19o8); Boise
Assn. of Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho 438 (1914) and see note to samein L. R. A.
1915 E-. 917; Hirth-Kraus Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. I (1912); State v. Artus,
ioLa. 44i (1903); McGray v. Woodbury, i ioMe. 163 (1912); Hart v. Roney,
93 Md. 432 (1901); Squire and Co. v. Tellier, i85 Mass. i8 (904); Spurr v.
Travis, 145 Mich. 721 (i9o6); Thorpe v. Pennock Mercantile Co., 99 Minn. 22
(19o6); Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Rowe, 97 Miss. 775 (1911); Wheeler & Motter
Co. v. Moon, 49 Mont. 307 (1914); Appel Mercantile Co. v. Barker, 92 Neb.
669 (1912); Kett v. Masker, 86 N. J. L. 97 (1914); Pender v. Speight, 159
N. C. 612 (1912); Humphrey v. Wagon Works, 37 Okla. 714 (1913); Coach v.
Gage, 70 Ore. 182 (1914); Feingold & Co. v. Steinberg, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 39
(907); Neas v. Borches, 1o9 Tenn. 398 (1902); Nash Hdw. Co. v. Morris,
1o5 Tex. 217 (1912); McDaniels v. Connelly Shoe CO., 30 Wash. 549 (1902);
Fisher V. Herrmann, 118 Wis. 424 (19o3); Lemieux v. Young, Trustee, 211 U. S.
A9s (9o9); Kidd Dater & Price Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 U. S. 461?1IO).
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result is reached as in the case of declaring the sale absolutely void.
The question would rather seem to be whether the statutes are uncon-
stitutional as depriving a person of property without due process of
law, or as class legislation.
The question of due process has been before the courts in a great
number of instances and it is settled that a statute does not deprive
one of property without due process in the constitutional sense,
"simply because it imposes burdens or abridges freedom of action,
or regulates occupations, or subjects individuals or property to
restraints in matters indifferent, except as they affect public inter-
ests or the rights of others." When legislation is passed under the
police power for the prevention of fraud it infringes the constitu-
tional guaranty only when it is extended to subjects not within its
scope.10 It is conceded that it is within the police power for the
legislature to enact reasonable laws for the prevention of fraud
and the protection of creditors.1 It would seem, therefore, that
the question as to whether these statutes infringed the due process
clause depended entirely upon the reasonableness of the conditions
prescribed.
As to the other argument that the statutes, being confined to
merchants, are class legislation, it has been held 2 by the United
States Supreme Court that this classification is based upon a reason-
able distinction if the act applies to all persons in the state who are
engaged in the selling of merchandise. It certainly would seem as
reasonable a distinction as one upheld in the New York Court of
Appealsu which allowed gambling inside the fence at horse races
but made it illegal outside the fence. We come, then, to the con-
clusion that if the statute imposes reasonable conditions it should
be held constitutional.
The evil sought to be suppressed by the statute is the practice
of certain merchants, when heavily in debt, of making secret sales of
their merchandise in bulk for the purpose of defrauding creditors.
It can be readily seen that the evil is universal in extent when the
number of states having statutes regulating such sales is considered. 14
The evil, being done in secret, is hard for the courts to unravel
because the evidence must come almost entirely from hostile wit-
nesses and can easily be covered by perjury. It is true that the
statutes may work hardship in some cases but a possible application
to extreme cases is not the test of reasonableness of public rules and
regulations.' s
Coming now to the present New York statute, are the conditions
there laid down unreasonable so as to make the statute unconstitu-
tional? In so considering the statute we must keep in mind the evil
"
0 See dissenting opinion of Vann J. in Wright v. Hart supra note 3 at page
353.
"Wright v. Hart, supra, note 3.
"Lenieux v. Young, Trustee, supra, note 9.
"See dissenting opinion of Cullen, Ch. J. in Wright v. Hart, supra, note 3, at
page 36o.
"
4See list of cases under note 7.
"Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375 (1889).
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to be remedied and its extent. As to the inventory demanded, an
inventory of the goods to be sold is demanded in any case by the
prudent vendee and the addition of the cost price of each article
is a mere detail. The notice to the creditors, demanded to be given
at least five days before the sale is completed, would not seem unrea-
sonable especially when it is considered that in many cases the
creditors of the seller practically have a greater interest in the goods
to be sold than the seller himself. In view of the numerous recording
acts passed in the behalf of purchasers it would seem that they are in
a poor position to complain of the few conditions imposed by this
statute.
The provisions of the New York Constitution so far as this question
is involved are the same as the privileges and immunities clause of
Section i of the i 4 th amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and as the act from which the New York act was copied
has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States 6 not
violative of the i 4 th amendment, it would seem not to violate the
privileges and immunities section of the New York Constitution
but to be a proper exercise of police power.
It is noteworthy that Justice Van Siclen in his opinion in Klein v.
Marvelas, supra, believed the present statute to be reasonable but
felt bound by the decision in Wright v. Hart, supra. This position
is hard to reconcile in view of the fact that the statute considered
in Wright v. Hart was a different statute from the present one.
As pointed out above, the present law does not require the
filing of answers to the inquiries of the statute, as that construed
on Wright v. Hart did, and it makes certain sales exempt from its
operation. Without such exceptions the law would greatly hamper
the administration of estates and retard the enforcing of judicial
process. The Hart case was decided by a divided bench of five
judges to four. It is barely possible that, had the exemptions
made in the present statute been in the statute there construed
and the requirement of filing the answer to the inquiries been omitted
from that statute as has been done in the present statute, the ques-
tion would have been decided differently. In any case it is hard
to see how the court in the Klin case was bound by the decision
construing a different statute in view of the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court 9 on the subject.
Frank B. Ingersoll, 'x7.
Contract: Agreements Tending to Oust the Jurisdiction of the
Courts.-Bya recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., Ii1 N.
E. 678 (19r6), it was held that a stipulation in a commercial contract
between a corporation domiciled in Massachusetts and a corporation
incorporated in Pennsylvania, that no action should be maintained
against the latter corporation in any state or federal court other than
the courts of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, was unenforceable and
6Kidd, Dater & Price Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., supra, note 9.
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did not preclude the maintenance of such an action in the courts of
Massachusetts. In reaching this conclusion, the court followed the
principle laid down in Nute v. Hamilton Ins. Co.,' the leading Massa-
chusetts case on the subject. There a stipulation that action was to
be brought only in one particular county was held invalid. The case
seemed to rest on the ground that it is not within the province of the
parties to enter into any agreement concerning the remedy for a
breach of contract, since such remedy is created and regulated by
law, and the parties cannot, by agreement, take away jurisdiction
from the courts where the law has given it. It has also been said that
the reason for the rule, that a provision in a contract by which the
parties seek to deny the right of one or both to resort to any court of
competent jurisdiction is invalid, is that the courts guard with jealous
eyes any contract innovations upon their jurisdiction. The Nute
case, supra, has been followed or cited in nearly every jurisdiction
where the question has arisen,2 although a Massachusetts case,
Mittenthal v. Mascagni,l has made an exception to the rule, where the
peculiar facts of a case show that such a stipulation, providing for the
bringing of suit in only one jurisdiction, is reasonable under all the
particular circumstances of the case. The court in the principal case,
however, declared that the Mittential case was not to be taken as
extending or liberalizing the rule of the Nute case, supra, and that,
while the Mittenthal case was sound upon its own peculiar facts, to
extend its principle to the case in hand would involve overruling the
Nute case. We may understand by this, then, that the principle
of the Mittenthal case is to be narrowly confined to cases having a
similar state of facts.
Generally, however, a provision like that in the principal case is not
binding whether it be to the effect that suit shall be brought only
in a certain court,4 or in a certain county,5 or state,6 or that suit shall
not be brought in a certain court
16 Gray (Mass.) i4 (1856).
'Healy v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 385 (igoi); Savage
v. People's Bldg., Loan & Savings Ass'n, 45 W. Va. 275 (1898); Blair v. Nat.
Shirt & Overalls Co., 137 Ill. App. 413 (907); Darling v. Protective Assurance
Society of Buffalo, 71 Misc. (N. Y.) 113 (1911); for exhaustive collection of
authorities, see 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 352 (1911).
3I83 Mass. 19 (1903).4Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 Fed. 508
(I897); Blair v. Nat. Shirt & Overalls Co., supra, note 2; Darling v. Protective
Assurance Society of Buffalo, supra, note 2.
5McLean v. Tobin, 58 Misc. (N. Y.) 528 (i9O8); Savage v. People's, etc.,
Ass'n, supra, note 2; Healy v. Eastern, etc. Ass'n, supra, note 2. See, however,
Benson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, i74 N. Y. 83 (1903), where a stipulation
that action was to be brought only in the county of Onondaga was held valid,
because it affected only the venue of the action and did not tend to oust thejurisdiction of the Supreme Court, since in New York there is but one Supreme
Court and the court, when it sits in Onondaga county and when it sits in any
other county, is exactly the same court. Therefore, the agreement of the parties
to bring suit in one particular county would not oust the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.6Buel v. Baltimore, etc. R. R. Cb., 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 646 (x898).
7Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 445 (1874); Barron v. Burnside, 121
U. S. 186 (1886).
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There is another class of agreements which are akin to that in the
principal case, viz., those which contain a clause providing for the
"reference to arbitration," i. e., to one or more persons as arbitrators
or referees, of all disputes which may arise under the contract. The
common law regarded such agreements as tending to oust the juris-
diction of the courts and refused to enforce them on grounds of public
policy. The reason for the rule adopted by the courts is by some
traced to the jealousy of the courts8 and a desire to repress all attempts
to encroach upon their jurisdiction; and by others to an aversion of
the courts, from reasons of public policy, to sanction contracts by
which the protection which the law affords the individual citizens is
renounced.
The modern tendency is to relax the common law rule,9 and while
the courts hold that a clause providing for the arbitration of all
matters in dispute, 0 or for the arbitration of future disputes about
matters of law," is unenforceable, as tending to oust the jurisdiction
of the courts, the following qualification is made in all modern
decisions: that an agreement to refer to arbitration all disputes as to
questions of fact, is binding and valid, whether such agreement is in
form a covenant or a condition precedent to bringing suit.2 It
should be noted that, as an exception in most states, a general clause
for the arbitration of all matters in dispute within fraternal or mutual
benefit societies is valid and binding on the parties. 3 It should also
be noted that the invalidity of a clause providing for arbitration will
not invalidate the whole contract. 14 If the clause is invalid, it is
merely ignored.
The principles above set forth were followed in a recent New York
case. 5 In that case a clause of a railroad construction contract,
providing for the decision by the railway company's chief engineer of
sFirst Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. White, 220 Mo. 717 (1909).
9Hood v. Hartshorn, ioo Mass. I17 (1868); Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v.
Pa. Coal Co., 5o N. Y. 250 (1872).
IOU. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. ioo6(1915); Sutro v. H.W. Balk, Inc., 151 N. Y. Sup. 764 (1915); Tilden v. Bernhard,
31 Ohio Cir. Ct. 255 (1909); Jefferson Fire Ins. Co. v. Bierce & Sage, 183 Fed. 588(i9io); Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205 (1911); Nat. Contracting
Co. v. Hudson River Water Power Co., 192 N. Y. 209 (19o8); Miles v. Schmidt,
168 Mass. 339 (1897); Meacham v. Jamestown, etc. R. R. Co., 211 N. Y. 346(1914); 2 Elliott on Contracts, p. 77. Supreme Council v. Forsinger, 125 Ind. 52
(1890).
"Sanitary District v. McMahon etc., Co., nIo Ill. App. 510 (1903).
_ Ruch v. York City, 233 Pa. 36 (1911); Jefferson Fire Ins. Co. v. Bierce &
Sage, supra, note io; Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal. Co, supra,
note 9; Hamilton v. Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 242 (189o); 2 Elliott on
Contracts, p. 78. In Pennsylvania such an agreement was held revocable by
either party because the arbitrators were not named: Commercial Union Ass.
Co. v. Hocking, u15 Pa. 407 (1886).
"Rood v. Railway, etc. Ass'n, 31 Fed 62 (1887); Van Pouke v. St. Vincent de
Paul Society, 63 Mich. 378 (1886); Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I17 Cal. 370(1897).
"Jefferson Fire Ins. Co. v. Bierce & Sage, supra, note co; Williams v. Branning
Mfg. Co., supra, note io; Sutro v. H. W. Balk, Inc., supra, note 10; 2 Elliott on
Contracts, p. 78.
"Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. R. Co., 211 N. Y. 346 (1914).
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all disputes under the contract, was held to provide for an adjustment
of all questions to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts and
hence to be against public policy and unenforceable. The court
recognized the validity of provisions in a contract providing for
arbitration to determine facts, or to ascertain amounts and values,16
and in condemning the provision stated above, declared, "If the judg-
ment of the court below is to stand, jurisdiction over controversies,
arising under such contracts, may be withdrawn from our courts and
the litigation remitted to arbitrators in distant states. The presence
of the parties here, the ownership of property in this jurisdiction,
these and other circumstances may make resort to our courts essential
to the attainment of justice. If jurisdiction is to be ousted by con-
tract, we must submit to the failure of justice that may result from
this and like causes. It is true that some judges have expressed the
belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such matters
as they please. In this state the law has long been settled to the
contrary. The jurisdiction of our courts is established by law, and it
is not to be diminished, any more than it is increased by the conven-
tion of the parties." Fred S. Reese, Jr., 'r8.
Contracts: Compromise and Settlement: Groundless Claim.-In
the case of Daniel v. Hughes, 72 So. (Ala.) 23 (igi6), the Alabama
Supreme Court recently decided contrary to the prevailing view in
cases of compromise of a disputed claim. It appears that a contro-
versy had arisen between the plaintiff and defendant in respect to the
sale of some land, or the procuring of a purchaser thereof. The
exact nature of the controversy does not appear. Plaintiff brought an
action claiming from the defendant $i,5oo damages for the breach of
an agreement entered into by which the defendant promised, in con-
sideration of the settlement of the dispute in regard to the land, to pay
plaintiff $goo. In delivering the opinion of the court, Anderson, Ch. J.,
concludes that the original claim of the plaintiff was groundless and
not a valid claim because none of the counts aver that anything was
due the plaintiff from the defendant- upon the original transaction.
Therefore, the original claim not being tenable, the compromise of
the dispute was not supported by a good consideration.
In regard to this question there are two lines of conflicting opinion.
The majority of the jurisdictions hold that an agreement made in
compromise of a disputed claim, or to avoid or to settle a litigation, is
based upon a sufficient consideration, whether the claim is enforceable
or not, provided the parties acted in good faith when they entered into
the compromise.' These courts refuse to go behind the compromise,
'Smith v. Richards, 29 Conn. 232 (i86o); Sigsworth v. Coulter, 18 Inl. 204(1856); Keefe v. Vogle, 36 Iowa 87, (1872); Flannagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 432
(1878); Clark v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 (1863); White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 5o5(1878); Feeter v. Weber, 78 N. Y. 334 (1878); Dovale v. Ackerman, I i Misc.(N. Y.) 245 (893); Russell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 504 (1842); Grandin v.
Grandin, 49 N. J. L. 5o8 (1887). The law in England seems to be in accord.
See Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449 (188o); Ockford v. Barelli,
25 L. T. 504 (sb,6). For a further list of cases see Professor Williston's edition
of Wald's "Pollock on Contracts", 3d. American Edition, p. 214 (23).
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saying that, if parties wish to forbear the annoying consequences of a
law suit, they should be allowed to do so, and that this compromise is
supported by a good consideration. 2  Other courts, in accord with the
principal case, hold that in order to support the compromise of a
disputed claim, the claim must be an actual one or founded upon a
colorable right about which there is room for doubt, and where the
claim is not capable of being sustained at law or in equity, its com-
promise has no legal consideration.3 They argue that it is no detri-
ment to the promisee to yield a claim which he never legally had.
The courts which sustain the compromise do so on the ground of
public policy in order to void the expense of litigation. It is clear,
then, that where the sufficiency of the consideration is tested by the
soundness of the original claim, the purpose of entering into the con-
tract is totally defeated, for, while certain compromise settlements are
held valid in these states, namely where the claim is really doubtful
in law, nevertheless it takes a suit to settle the question as to whether
the original claim was doubtful or meritorious, and the parties are
therefore, never immune from suit. It follows then, that there is no
inducement to enter into the compromise, for, if the parties may be
called upon to litigate their original claim anyway, they might better
never have entered into the compromise. It will be seen that the
compromise may serve no useful purpose in those states.
Most of the jurisdictions in this country sustain the compromise
and do not undertake to pass upon the validity of the original claim
when the compromise comes before them, being satisfied with the
agreement, provided no element of fraud or duress is alleged. Public
policy seems to dictate that such agreements should be upheld in
order to void as far as practicable the opening up of these settlements
which the parties themselves have agreed upon.
Geo. W. Dunn, '8.
Contract: Performance to Satisfaction.-In Hanaford v. Stevens
Co., 98 At. (R. I.) 209 (rpz6), the plaintiff entered into a contract to
act as traveling salesman for the sale of optical goods for defendants
for a period of three years and three months, agreeing "to perform in
every particular all the various duties of his position in a faithful,
efficient and satisfactory manner." After two years the defendant
discharged the plaintiff on the ground that his services were not
satisfactory. In an action for damages the court rendered judgment
for the plaintiff which was affirmed on appeal.
The question involved is one of contract of performance to the
satisfaction of a party. The court treated the subject in the con-
ventional way, separating the cases of this general character into two
classes; one class in which the subject of the contract involves
personal taste or feeling; and the other class where the subject
matter is such that the satisfaction stipulated for applies to quality,
workmanship, saleability and other like considerations; the court
2Dolcher v. Fry, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 152, 157 (1862).
"Ware v. Morgan 67 Ala. 461 (r88o); Gunning v. Royal, 59 Miss. 45 (i88);
Sullivan v. Collins, i8 Iowa 87 (1865); Home Ins. Co. v. Skoumal, 5r Neb. 655
(19o6). Seealsog Cyc. 341.
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holding that, as to the first class, the buyer was the sole judge and
that in the second class the agreement that it shall be satisfactory
must mean that it shall be "reasonably satisfactory."
In the discussion of the subject the court apparently obscures the
underlying principle that a person has a perfect right to contract for
performance to his sole satisfaction in all cases. Whether or not a
person has contracted for performance to his sole satisfaction is a
question of construction in each case. In matters involving personal
taste and feelings it is the settled construction that he so contracted.'
The courts recognize that in matters of this kind there is no absolute
standard as to what is good or bad and leave each man free to act on
his own ideas, tastes or prejudices, as the case may be. If the party
so contracting is dissatisfied, the other party is not entitled to recover,
even though the dissatisfaction may have been unreasonable.2 But
in matters involving mechanical fitness and utility where the rejection
of the work or chattel would not put the other party in as good a
position as he was before, the contract will ordinarily be construed as
meaning that he intended to contract that he would be satisfied -with
what in reason he ought to be satisfied.3  He is supposed to
undertake that he will act reasonably and fairly, and found his
determination on grounds which are just and sensible. In a few
instances4 , however, even where operative fitness and mechanical
utility are involved, courts have allowed the defendant the absolute
right of rejection, but in these cases the intent was so clearly expressed
that performance be to the sole satisfaction of defendant, that the
contract was incapable of any other construction, one court saying:
"It sometimes happens that the right is fully reserved where it is the
chief ground, if not the only one, that the party is determined to
preserve an unqualified option and is not willing to leave his freedom
of choice exposed to any contention or subject to any contingency.
He will not enter into any bargain except upon the condition of
reserving the power to do what others might regard as unreasonable."&
The court in the principal case says that the defendant must act
in good faith in refusing to perform his part of the contract. This
is insufficient. He must not only show that he was really dissatisfied
but must also show that his dissatisfaction is the reason for his refusal
to perform. The dissatisfaction must be honest and sincere and not
'Zaleskiv. Clark, 44 Conn. 218 (1876); Brown v. Poster, 113 Mass. 136 (1873);
White v. Randall, 153 Mass. 394 (1891); McCarren v. McNulty, 7 Gray (Mass.)
139 (1856); Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49 (1878); Moore v. Goodwin, 43 Hun
(N. Y.) 534 (1887); Johnson v. Bindseil, 15 Daly (N. Y.) 492 (1890); Marshall
v. Ames, ii Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 363 (1896); Meacham v. Gardner, 27 Pa. Super Ct.
296 (19o5); Pennington v. Howland, 21 R. I. 65 (1898).2Zaleski v. Clark, supra, note i.
3Electric Lighting Co. v. Elder Bros. 15 Ala. 138 (1897); Keeler v. Clifford,
62 Ill. App. 64 (1895); Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284 (1889); Duplex
Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden et al., io N. Y. 387 (1886); Pennington v. Howland,
suspra, note I.
"Wood Reaping Machine Co. v. Smith, 5o Mich. 565 (1883); Gray v. Central
R. R. Co., I I Hun (N. Y.) 70 (1877); Singerly v. Thayer, io8 Pa. St. 291 (i885).
6Wood Reaping Machine Co. v. Smith, ,rapra, note 4.
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feigned.6 Otherwise the promisor would not be bound by his agree-
ment unless he later wished to be so and the agreement would not be a
contract, for it would lack mutuality of obligation.
In New York the cases may be divided into the two usual groups.
In cases involving personal taste and feeling the courts have invariably
decided that performance must be to defendant's sole satisfaction.7
In the mechanical utility cases perhaps the case most frequently
cited is Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden.8  In that case the parties
contracted for the alteration of certain boilers to be paid for only
when the defendants were "well satisfied that the boilers as changed
were a success." The defendants pleaded non-satisfaction but the
plaintiff was allowed to recover, the court saying "that which the law
will say a contracting party ought in reason to be satisfied with, that
the law will say he is satisfied with." The result of the case is no
doubt proper, but the reasoning of the court is open to criticism. The
court says that "if the defendants are at liberty to determine for
themselves when they are satisfied, there would be no obligation and
consequently no agreement which could be enforced." But the
parties have left it to defendant to say whether he is satisfied and, if
he determines that he is satisfied, then he is under obligation to
perform. Although the courts have construed an agreement of this
kind when mechanical utility is involved so that defendant must be
satisfied with what in reason ought to satisfy him, it does not neces-
sarily follow that there would be no obligation and consequently no
agreement which could be enforced. The court cited with approval
Folliard v. Wallace.9 There the defendant covenanted that in case
the title to a lot of land conveyed to him by the plaintiff should prove
good and sufficient in law against all other claims he would pay
plaintiff $i 5o three months after he should be "well satisfied" that the
title was undisputed. Defendant pleaded that he was not well
satisfied, but the court held for plaintiff and said "a simple allegation
of dissatisfaction, without some good reason assigned for it might be
a mere pretext and cannot be regarded." The reasoning is fallacious.
The parties have contracted for performance to satisfaction and the
defendant has the right to decide whether he is satisfied. It is not
for the court to deny him that right because there is a possibility that
he might allege dissatisfaction as a pretext, if in fact there was no
evidence that his dissatisfaction was feigned.
Harvey L Tutchings, 'z.
OLighting Co. v. Elder Bros., 115 Ala. 138 (1897); Carpenter v. Chemical Co.,
98 Va. 177(1900); Plumbing Co. v. Carr, 54 W. Va. 272 (1903).7Butler v. Tucker, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 446 (1840); Hoffman v. Gallaher, 6 Daly(N. Y.) 42 (1875); Spring v. Clock Co. 24 Hun (N. Y.) 175 (1881); Glenny v.
Lacy, i N. Y. Supp. 513 (1888); Gray v. Alabama Nat. Bank, to N. Y. Supp. 5
(i89I); Haven v. Russell, 34 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1895); Walker v. Thompson Co.,
56 N. Y. Supp. 326 (x899); Dermody v. Flesher, 49 N. Y. Supp. 15O (1898);
Crawford v. Mail Publishing Co., 163 N. Y. 404 (1900).
8loi N. Y. 387 (i886).
92 Johns. (N. Y.) 395 (807).
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Criminal Law: Offer to Accept Smaller Salary as Bribery under
Corrupt Practices Act.-In the recent case of Prentiss v. Dittmar, 112
N. E. (Ohio) 1o2 (zgi6), Prentiss, the plaintiff in error, was the
successful candidate for the office of Common Pleas judge. Before
his induction into office, Dittmar, one of the unsuccessful candidates
filed a petition with the Court of Appeals, contesting the validity of
the election. The petition, among other things, alleged that Prentiss,
as a candidate, and for the purpose of inducing voters to vote for
him, caused to be printed and widely distributed certain circulars
containing a promise that, in the event of his election, he would not
accept certain fees which were payable to him out of the local treasury,
but would only accept that part of his salary which was payable out
of the state treasury. The petition contained no allegation that
these statements influenced any voters to vote for Prentiss, but it did
allege that they were used by the plaintiff in error as "arguments for
the purpose of inducing the electors to vote for him." The Court
of Appeals held the election invalid, whereupon the case was appealed.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that such a promise, extended to
the voters of a community, fell within the inhibition of the Corrupt
Practices Act in force in that state,' which act provides that any
person is guilty of corrupt practice, if he, in connection with, or in
respect of any election, contributes, or offers to contribute, any money
or valuable consideration, for any other purposes than those detailed
therein. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
This holding seems to be in accord with the majority of the Ameri-
can cases.2 In an early Kansas case,3 where the candidate agreed to
accept a smaller salary than that stipulated by law, the court ruled
that such an offer to accept a salary which would reduce the tax upon
each taxpayer approximately one dollar, was equivalent to a direct
offer by the candidate to pay one dollar of each man's taxes. The
court, in the course of the argument, said, "The theory of popular
government is that the most worthy should hold office. Personal
fitness * * * and in that is included moral character, intellectual
ability, social standing, habits of life, and political convictions * * *
is the single test which the law will recognize. That which throws
other considerations into the scale * * * tends to turn the thought
of the voter from the one question which should be paramount in his
mind when he deposits the ballot. It is bribery, more insidious, and,
therefore, more dangerous, than the grosser form of directly offering
money to the voter."
In the principal case, it seems that, under the Ohio statute, it was
not necessary to allege and prove that electors were in fact influenced
by the promise made. In Wisconsin, however, the statute requires,
'Sec. 5175-26, Ohio General Code.
2State ex rel. Attorney General v, Collier, 72 Mo. 13 (188o); Carrothers v.
Russell, 53 Iowa 346 (88o); State ex rel. Newell v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213 (1874);
Bush v. Head, 154 Cal. 277 (igo8); Galpin v City of Chicago, 269 Inl. 27 (1915);
Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 428 (1838); Clements v. Humphries, 74 Tex.
466 (x889).
3State ex rel. Bill v. Elting, 29 Kan. 397 (1883).
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that the candidate shall have induced or procured an elector to vote
for him by bribery, in which event it is necessary not only to allege
hat certain voters were induced and procured, but to prove that they
were so influenced by the offer.4
The courts distinguish between this class of cases and those in
which the candidate promises to do certain things in the interest of
reform, economy, and a rigid administration of office.5 The former
savour of vicious tendencies, and tend to break down the test of
personal fitness for office, while the latter class deals with promises
made in the interest of the public and are entirely consistent with
personal integrity and the preservation of the government.
Another class of cases which should be distinguished from the
principal case, comprises those cases in which a promise is made to
the electors generally, by a municipality, or by a citizen thereof, to
donate money or other property to the county, if such municipality
shall be selected as the county seat, at an election held for the purpose
of deciding upon the location thereof. This is held, by the majority
of the courts, 6 not to constitute bribery. But in the case of Ayers v.
Moan,7 the court held that even this sort of promise constituted
bribery, citing an earlier Nebraska case," in which the court said,
"The whole course of our legislature is against every species of bribery
or inducement of that nature at elections. What would be thought of
a candidate for public office who should promise the electors $3,000 in
case of his election? And does it make any difference that the
candidate is a town contending for the county seat instead of an
individual seeidng office? The cases do not differ in principle, but in
the mode of compensation." The weight of authority, in these cases,
however, seems to be that such offers by a municipality or citizens
thereof do not constitute bribery.
TV. J. Gilleran '8.
Domestic Relations: Annulment of Marriage for Fraud.-The
liberal tendency of the courts in annulling marriage contracts on the
ground of fraud' is emphasized by the case of Moore v. Moore, 94
Misc. (N. Y.) 37o (9x6). In that case the wife asked for annulment
of the marriage on the ground of fraud. The facts showed that,
when the plaintiff was about to become the mother of an illegitimate
child, the defendant, the father of the child, was persuaded by friends
of the plaintiff to marry her. This he did, but immediately after the
marriage and before consummation, the defendant abandoned the
plaintiff and remained continuously absent for six years. On these
facts the court foumd sufficient evidence that the defendant did not
intend, at the time the marriage was celebrated, to assume and fulfill
4State v. Bunnell, 131 Wis. i98 (1907).5Carrothers v. Russell, supra, note 2.
Weal v. Shinn, 4 Ark. 227 (1887); Douglas v. Baker County, 23 Fla. 419
(1887); Hawes v. Miller, 56 Iowa 395 (i881); State v. Elting, supra, note 3;
Wells v. Taylor, 5 Mont. 202 (1884).734 Neb. 210 (1892).8 Herman v. Edson, 9 Neb. 152 (1879), at page 156.
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the duties of a husband to a wife. The court held that this was
such a fraud as to warrant the annulment of the marriage.
There were no active misrepresentations on the part of the defend-
ant. Very evidently the fraud meant by the court was the state of
the defendant's mind in speaking the words of the marriage contract,
while not meaning to fulfill the same. The court said, "One who
goes through the marriage ceremony represents in so many words
his intention and purpose to fulfill all the obligations of a husband
to the woman he marries. We can conceive of no greater fraud on a
woman than for the man at the same time entertaining and carrying
out the purpose of forthwith absconding and leaving his wife to her
own resources, regardless of moral and legal obligations imposed by
the status. Misrepresentations of purpose and intention, whether
express or necessarily implied, which constitute a material fact
inducing another to act, constitute a fraud affecting the validity of
the contract induced thereby."
Bishop2 states that in a case of marriage with intent to desert the
court refuses the decree of nullity prayed for. He refers to the
early Connecticut case of Benton v. Benton3. In that case the defend-
ant when arrested under a bastardy process, after having gotten
the plaintiff with child, married her to be freed from the process and
then at once absconded. The Superior Court of Connecticut refused
to annul the marriage upon the wife's petition. It laid down the rule
that a marriage contract could only be annulled on the ground of
fraud when the fraud was of such a nature as to render the contract
unlawful from the beginning, as physical incompetency or con-
sanguinity. The Connecticut court feared the social consequences
of annulling the marriage contract for mere trivial frauds, and it
shrank from laying the burden upon the courts of discriminating
between the various degrees of fraud.
A half century later, however, in i85s, the Vermont court in Barnes
v. Wyethe4 annulled a marriage which was plainly fraudulent, and for
the purpose of imposing the care of the wife, who was a pauper,
upon another town. , It held that it was fraud where the husband
was hired to go through the form of marriage without fulfilling or
intending to fulfill its obligation. And it was such a fraud as war-
ranted the annullment of the marriage. In Miller v. Miller,5 in
1894, the Ohio. court, on a state of facts identical with Benton v.
Benton, granted a decree of annullment of the marriage for fraud,
upon the petition of the wife. The court said, "Mere words without
any intention corresponding to them will not make a marriage or any
other civil contract." The court quoted McClurg v. Terry6 in which
the plaintiff and the defendant were married as a jest, neither of
them understanding it would be a marriage contract, and in which
the court held that it was no contract.
21 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, section 476.
31 Day (Conn.) ili (18o3).
428 Vt. 41 (1855).
531 Weekly Law Bulletin (Ohio) 141 (1894).
52i N. J. Equity 225 (1870).
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Only a few months after the New York decision, in Moore v.
Moore, supra, the Massachusetts court in Anders v. Anders7 passed
upon the same question. In the latter case the woman married solely
to secure the right to bear the name of a married woman, and so
to avoid the disgrace of being the mother of the illegitimate child
of another man, and with the affirmative intention of leaving the hus-
band at the church door and never seeing him again. The marriage
on the libel of the husband was annulled for fraud. The court held
that just as a contract of purchase is voidable for fraud, where the
buyer does not intend to pay for the goods at the time the contract is
made," a fortiori the same results follow in case of a contract to enter
in the holy state of matrimony." 8 This same analogy was recognized
in Moore v. Moore, supra, which cites Adams v. ellig.' Inthatcasethe
defendant induced the plaintiff to sell a vacant lot to him, by falsely
stating that he intended to build a residence upon it. In fact he
intended and undertook to build a public garage. The court held
"that the false statements made by the defendant of his intention
should, under the circumstances of the case, be deemed to be a
statement of a material existing fact of which the court will lay hold
for the purpose of defeating the wrong that would otherwise be
consummated thereby."
It would seem that the courts have recognized that a mere state
of mind, where the intention is vital to the contract, is such a fraud
as will warrant the annullment of the marriage contract, where there
has been no consummation. Attention should be called to the fact
that in none of these cases has the court had to pass on fraudulent
marriage followed by consummation. But in Moore v. Moore, supra,
the court considered the fact that the marriage had not ripened into
a status, and evidently was more ready to grant an annuliment in
view of that fact.
A very different situation is presented in this class of cases when
the defrauding party seeks to annul the marriage for fraud In
Wimbrough v. Wimbrough"1 it was the husband, who after marrying
to obtain a release from a bastardy process, sued for annullment of
the marriage on the ground of duress. The court refused to annul
the marriage. Whether such a suit is brought on the ground of
duress or of fraud it must fail, when it is the defrauder who is asking
for annullment. He will not be permitted to profit by his own fraud.
As the court pointed out in Miller v. Miller" the defrauding party
is estopped from denying his own declarations. It is only at the
option of the defrauded party that this class of marriages will be
annulled for fraud.
H. Mason Olney, 'r8.
lIi3 N. E. (Mass.) 203 (1916).835 Cyc. 8o and cases cited.
gi99 N. Y. 314 (191o).
10125 Md. 6r9 (I916).
ISupra, note 5.
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Domestic Relations: Survival of Actions for Breach of Promise:
Special Damage.-The case of Quirk v. Thomas, (1915) 1 K. B. 798,
presents the question whether damages for breach of promise
to marry may be recovered from the executor or administrator
of the deceased promisor, or whether such action dies with him.
In that ease the plaintiff had given up a profitable business on the
strength of the deceased's promise of marriage, and suffered heavy
financial loss as well as mental anguish because of his failure to per-
form. Yet the action was held not to survive against his executor.
The earliest case in which this problem arose is the much cited
Chamberlain v. Williamson,' in which the woman's executor brought
the action against the promisor, and Lord Ellenborough laid down
the rule that the action could not survive unless "special damage"
were shown, pointing out that executors and administrators represent
the temporal property, not the wrongs of the deceased, "except
where those wrongs operate to the temporal injury of their personal
estate." No attempt was made to define more clearly the term
"special damage," and its use in this early case is ascribed to the
"extreme caution" employed in deciding a case of first impression.2
This decision has never been repudiated in England, and the
American states, apparently with only three exceptions, namely,
North Carolina, Louisiana, and Iowa, have followed it. The first
American decision on the point is Stebbins v. Palmer,3 and there
the statement that the action will not survive without special damage
is repeated. Here, too, the court is cautious about venturing an
opinion as to what special damage would be sufficient to cause a
survival of the action, but this seems true of many courts, which
simply repeat Lord Ellenborough's statement without any attempt
to explain what is meant by special damage.4
Some courts, however, by dicta have attempted to define what
they deem to be such special damage. An early definition is "damage
to property, and such as would be sufficient of itself to sustain a
suit." In another case, it is said to consist of an acquisition by the
defendant of some valuable addition to the estate from the plaintiff
on the strength of the promise of marriage. 6 But the value of benefits
thus conferred, if by contract, is properly recoverable anyway in
quasi-contract, and such action would, of course, survive. In Finlay
v. Chirney,7 Lord Esher, after expressing" grave doubts" as to whether
the action would survive even with special damage, and after remark-
ing that he could " hardly conceive" of a case where such special dam-
age could arise as would support the action, says that if another
promise affecting the personal property of the one party or the other
was made at the same time as the promise to marry, it might be such
12 M. & S. 408 (1814).
'Chase v. Fitz, 132 Mass. 359 (1882).
318 Mass. (I Pick.) 71 (1822).4Lattimore v. Simmons, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 183 (1825); Hayden v. Vreeland,
37 N. J. L. (8 Vroom) 372 (1875); Grubb v. Sult, 32 Grat. (Va.) 203 (1879).5Hovey v. Page, 55 Me. 142 (1867).
OChase v. Fitz, supra, note 2.
72o Q. B. D. 494 (1888).
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special damage. There need not have been an express promise, but
merely circumstances showing that both parties contemplated that a
breach must affect the property of one or the othet. Clearly mere
financial loss is not sufficient, as, for example, in Quirk v. Thomas,
supra, where the plaintiff gave up her business position, nor, as the
court points out in that case, is the purchase of a trousseau such
special damage.
As stated above, the action is permitted to survive in the states
of North Carolina, Louisiana, and Iowa, a view due partly to peculiar
statutes and a liberal interpretation of them. The North Carolina
court in construing the statute dealing with the survival of actions
allowed this form of action to survive,8 but in a later case 9 this
decision, though recognized as a binding authority, was disapproved,
the court favoring the abatement of the action unless special damage
were shown. In Louisiana, the right of action for breach of promise
is said to assume an "independent status" which is heritable and may
be enforced against the deceased's estate. 0 By statute in Iowa,
"All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwith-
standing the death of the person entitled or liable to the same.""
In no case in the American or English reports has the requisite
special damage been alleged and proved, and the action permitted
to survive, and all the opinions as to the necessary special damage
must therefore be considered dicta. In Frazer v. Boss,12 where the
woman had transferred to the deceased promisor the goods, furniture.
and fixtures in her store in consideration of his promise of marriage,
and he had later refused to marry her, and kept the goods or the pro-
ceeds thereof, action was brought to recover as for goods sold and
delivered. It was held to survive as a quasi-contractual obligation
against his executor, but not as a breach of promise action, and the
court, though intimating that this might be such special damage as
would cause a breach of promise action to survive, declined to base
its decision on that ground.
In this state of the law, the question as to what constitutes "special
damage" may still be considered an open one.
Malcolm B. Carroll, '18.
Evidence: Presumption of Death from Absence: Amount of Pre-
liminary Proof Necessary to Raise the Presumption: Presumption
One of Law or Fact.-Whether diligent inquiry is necessary before the
presumption of death arises is the question involved in Page v. Modern
Woodmen of America, x56 N. W. (Wis.) i37 (iz6). In 19oi the
defendant order issued a benefit certificate upon the life of the
plaintiff's husband, Arthur E. Page, which was payable upon his
death. After becoming so insured, Page did nothing inconsistent
with the provisions of the policy. In March, x9o5, after engaging in
8Shuler v. Milisaps, 71 N. C. 297 (1874).
'AUen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91 (1882).
'Ojohnson v. Levy, iI8 La. 447 (19o7) and 122 La. i18 (x9O8).
"Annotated Code of the State of Iowa, see. 3443.
1266 Ind. 1, 13 (1879).
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a timber enterprise, he disappeared, never communicating thereafter
with his wife nor returning to his home at Frederic, Wisconsin,
although he was on pleasant terms with the former and devoted to his
children. However, there were some financial obligations, several of
which were maturing about the time of his disappearance. The
plaintiff, after inquiring among relatives and friends as to his where-
abouts and advertising in Woodmen papers when assessments became
due, gave up further inquiry, thereafter paying his dues as they arose
until November, 1912. Eighteen months after Page's disappearance,
word was received from his brother at St. Louis, that Page had been
there during the summer of 19o5, departing ostensibly to go to
Galveston, Texas.
The court, following the precedent of an earlier Wisconsin case,'
which decided that proof of diligent search and inquiry was not
necessary before the presumption of death could be raised, held that
sufficient evidence was presented to establish a legal presumption of
his death, entitling plaintiff to a directed verdict.
According to the more modem rule,2 however, in order to raise the
presumption of death there must not only be evidence of the absence
from home or place of residence for a period of seven years, but there
must be a lack of information regarding the absent one on the part of
'those with whom he would naturally communicate, after diligent
inquiry. Thus the court in Modern Woodmen of America v. Gerdom3 ,
said, "Facts which are sufficient to put an interested party upon
inquiry will constitute information regarding the existence of the
absent one, unless duly tested; and, until reasonable effort has been
expended to exhaust all patent sources of information, and all others
which the circumstances of the case may suggest, it cannot truthfully
be asserted that diligent inquiry has been made." It is pointed out
that because of the breadth of this country and the migratory nature
of its people, the presumption has less force here than in England
where it originated and that the assumption is often contrary to the
truth and, therefore, should not be permitted to be too easily or too
readily established. With modem publicity and facility of communi-
cation, no acceptable excuse can be offered for ignorance of any one's
whereabouts until all available sources of information have been
exhausted. In the principal case, there was a failure to investigate
and inquire at Galveston, Texas, where Page was said to have goner
It, therefore, could not be sustained under the more modem rule, for
to quote again from the Gerdom case:4 "Any word received by any-
one who might naturally be expected to hear at any time within the
'Miller v. Sovereign Camp, 140 Wis. 505 (1909).
2Hansen v. Owens, 132 Ga. 648 (19o9); Kennedy v. Modem Woodmen of
America, 243 Ill. 56o (191o); Modem Woodmen of America v. Gerdom, 72 Kan.
391 (19o5); Wentworth v. Wentworth, 71 Me. 72 (188o); Shriver v. State, 65
Md. 278 (1896); Stockbridge's Case, 145 Mass. 517 (1887); Bailey v. Bailey, 36
Mich. 181 (1877); U. of N. C. v. Harrison, 9o N. C. 385 (1884); Dietrich v.
Dietrich, 128 App. Div. (N. Y.) 564 (19o8); Morrison's Estate, 183 Pa. 155
(1897).
'Modem Woodmen of America v. Gerdon, supra, note 2.4Modem Woodmen of America v. Gerdon, supra, note 2.
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seven year period destroys the presumption of death, and unless the
resources of this field of information have been exhausted, an allega-
tion of death cannot be sustained."
Historically,6 the presumption of death from an absence of seven
years without being heard from, developed from the presumption of
continuance of life, or, that a person once known to be alive was
presumed to continue to live until the contrary was proven. In
England, by analogy to the statute exempting from bigamy those
marrying the second time after seven years' absence of the first
spouse, and that concerning leases determinable upon lives, judges
began to rule that the presumption of life ceased at the end of seven
years from the time when he was last heard of. Gradually they
expressed this cessation as an affirmative presumption of death, so
that it has now become a rule of law requiring that death be assumed
under the given circumstances. In New Yorl the presumption has
developed in a similar manner, by analogy to the statute relating to
the presumption of death of persons upon whose lives estates in land
depend.
It is to be noted, however, that while there is a definitely established
presumption that one is dead at the end of the seven year period,
there is no presumption as to the precise time of the death,7 and the
burden of proving the particular period in which it occurred lies upon
the party to whose cause or title that fact is essential.8 Where the
absence is explicable upon some ground other than an assump-
tion of death, the presumption should not be permitted to operate.
Thus, where a man was a fugitive from justice, that fact was held
sufficient to rebut the presumption.9
The statement that the presumption of death is now a "rule of law"
invites a discussion of the proper sense and use of the word "pre-
sumption." The term has been misused and misapplied by courts
and judges in the past so as to become ambiguous and cause confu-
sion.10 Indeed, Chamberlayne," in the following terse comment,
suggests its removal entirely: "The wish that the term could be
finally dropped will interest any one who has had occasion to
consider the matter with any care, and the more strongly by reason
of the fact that it is entirely superfluous and principally used at the
present time on account of its convenient obscurity."
Presumptions in their proper sense are arbitrary rules of law
recognized by the courts, which are based upon the probative strength
5Thayer, Prel. Treatise on Ev. at Common Law, chap. 8.
'Mc Cartee v. Camel, i Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 455 (1846).7Adams v. Jones, 39 Ga. 479 (1869); Whiting v. Nicoll, 46 Ill. 230 (1867);
Seeds v. Grand Lodge, 93 Iowa 175 (1894); Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. iii(1888); Hancock v. Amer. Ins. Co 62 Mo. 26 (1876); Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S.
628 (1878); Nepean v. Doe, 2 M. kW. (Eng.) 894 (1837); Inre Phene's Trusts,
L. R. 5 Ch. 139 (x869).
8In re Phene's Trusts, supra, note 7.
'Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. Martin, lo8 Ky. ii (19oo).
104 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2491; :2 Chamberlayne, Evidence, sec. 1026;
Bell v. Town of Clarion, Y13 Iowa 126 (i9O1); Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H., 553,
563 (870).
112 Chamberlayne, Evidence, sec. 1026.
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of the evidentiary fact and operate without regard to the real-truth, by
assuming the truth of certain matters in a given inquiry.12 They
rest upon the basis of general experience, probability of any kind,
policy or convenience. Thus, it has been said that the presumption
of death is "an arbitrary one rendered necessary on grounds of public
policy in order that rights depending on the life or death of persons
long absent and unheard of might be settled by some certain rule." 13
It is from these assumptions that a large part of our substantive law
has arisen. Inferences of fact have developed in course of time into
presumptions of law, the latter often becoming indisputable and
finally being elevated to the position of maxims of jurisprudence. 14
One cannot, however, agree with the commonly accepted classifica-
tion, 5 that presumptions are on the one hand, those of fact and on
the other, those of law. The former are in truth not presumptions at
all, no legal consequence being attached to them. Wigmore 6 says
in part that "a presumption of fact in the usual sense, is merely an
improper term for the rational potency, or probative value of the
evidentiary fact, regarded as not having this necessary legal conse-
quence. They have no significance so far as affects the duty of one
or the other party to produce evidence because there is no rule of law
attached to them, and the jury may give to them whatever force or
weight it thinks best-just as it may to other evidence." For
example, where smoke can be seen coming from a chimney, one may
reasonably infer the existence of a fire, and similarly where a ship
founders, without apparent cause soon after leaving port, one may
infer that she was unseaworthy at departure. 1 These are merely
inferences whose basis rests in logic, in inductive reasoning, whose
source is probability,18 and they should be so designated. The con-
clusion to be drawn from them lies solely within the province of thejury and disregarding such an inference, no matter how strong, will
result in a new trial only in the court's discretion. 9
Presumptions of law, then, are the only true presumptions and the
only sense in which that term should be used. A presumption of law
is a "rule of law announcing a definite probative weight attached by
jurisprudence to a proposition of logic. It is an assumption made by
the law that a strong inference of fact is prima facie correct and will
therefore sustain the burden of evidence until conflicting facts on the
point are shown. When such evidence is introduced the assumption
of law is functus officio and drops out of sight. The inference of fact
12Thayer, Pre. Treatise on Ev. at Common Law, Chap. 8; 6 Law Mag. 348(Oct. x831); Ward v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 66 Conn. 227, 238 (1895).
"Jones, Evidence, sec. 61.
4Ward v. Met. Life Ins. Co., supra, note 9.1516 Cyc. IO5O; Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273 (1886); Roberts v. People, 9
Col. 458, 474 (1886); United States v. Searcey, 26 Fed. Rep. 435 (1885).
"United States v. Sykes, 58 Fed. Rep. 1000, (1893); Justice v. Lang, 52 N. Y.
323, 327 (1873).
164 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2491.
17Justice v. Lang, supra, note 12.
"8Liverpool L. & G. Ins. Co. v. So. Pacific Co., 125 Cal. 434 (1899); Dietrich v.
Deitrich, 128 App. Div. (N. Y.) 564 (1908).
"Sun. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U. S. 485, 502 (1882).
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which has been assumed to be correct continues to have its logical
weight in the case." 20  The legal effect of these real presumptions is
to put the burden of going forward with evidence on the party against
whom they operate. They are not in themselves evidence, 2' although
some courts have given them probative force in addition to the
probative value of the facts of which they are composed22, nor do they
belong to the law of evidence but rather to the substantive law with
which they are connected." These presumptions have been divided
generally into two classes, namely: (i) disputable presumptions, and
(2) conclusive presumptions. If the disputable presumption is not
contradicted, it becomes a rule of law indisputable for the case and
must be regarded by the jury.n Where it is disregarded, a new trial
will be granted ex debita Justiticu.2 The so-called conclusive presump-
tions of law are absolute rules governing the disposition of the case
whose truth or falsity cannot be investigated. That the term
"conclusive presumption" is a misnomer since ex vi termini a presump-
tion is rebuttable is stated by many authors.2 It is a term which
should be dispensed with. It is to be hoped that at some future day,
the authorities will agree upon some uniform terminology which shall
eliminate the confusion prevalent in this subject.
Leonard G. Aierstok, '17.
Libel: Refusal of Equity to Enjoin.-Some of the most common of
our legal doctrines seem to be applied by the courts on the same
principle that the rain is sent on the just and on the unjust. The
law sheds its blessings with impartiality, but also, frequently, with
injustice. This is because ethics and the law are not, and never have
been, equivalent. Ethics are the standards to which a man ought to
conform; law is the standard to which he must conform. As long as
men regard any suggested custom as theoretically fair and just, but
impracticable, we have an ethical rule; but when the majority begin
to observe this custom as a practical guide in intercourse between
man and man, and to punish those who ignore it, then we have a law.
All ethics eventually become law, sometimes because an independent
judge overrides established custom, and sometimes because the
2016 Cyc 1050; for other definitions, see 6 Law Ma-. 348 (Oct. 1831); 1 Green-
leaf, Evidence, see. 44; Jones, Evidence, sec. I; 22 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law
1234; 9 Ency. of Evidence 87§; Levins v. Rovegno, supra, note i2; Doane v.
Glenn, I Col. 495 (1872); United States v. Searcey, supra, note 12; United States
v. Sykes, supra, note 12; Lisbon v. Lyman, supra, note 7; State v. Hodge, 50
N. H. 510, 521 (1869); Justicev. Lang, supra, note 12; Commonwealth v. Frew,
3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 492, 496 (1887); Tanner v. Hughes, 5o Pa. St. 289, 291 (i866).21Thayer, Prel. Treatise on Bv. at Common Law, chap. 8; 9 Ency. of Ev. 886,
887; State v. Jones, 64 Iowa 349, 362 (1884); Lisbon v. Lyman, supra, note 7.
uSturdevant's Appeal, 71 Conn. 392 (i899); Graves v. Colwell, 90 Iln. 612
(1878).
uThayer, Prel. Treatise on Bv. at Common Law, chap. 8.24Thayer, Prel. Treatise, supra, note 20; Kidder v. Stevens, 6o Cal. 414 (1882);
United States v. Sykes, supra, note 12; Biegler Case, 57 Mo. App. 419 (1894);
Youngs v. Heffner, 36 Oh. St. 232 (i88o); Tanner v. Hughes, 53 Pa. St. 289, 291
(1866).25Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co. 107 U. S. 485, 502 (1882).
264 Wigrmore, Evidence, see. 2492; i6 Cyc. io8o; 9 Ency. of Evidence 884.
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cumulation of public necessity sweeps aside the conservatism of the
courts; but "the mills of the gods grind slowly, though they grind
exceeding fine."
The refusal of courts of equity to grant injunctions restraining
libels is one instance in which the law has for centuries been retarded
in its advance toward ethical perfection. A may lay a pipe over a
piece of practically worthless land belonging to B, and upon B's
application equity will restrain A because of the irreparable injury to
the property rights of B, and also to save B the necessity of many
successive suits at law. But A may spread a malicious falsehood
about B, injuring him irretrievably in the eyes of his family, his
friends, and the world, and may declare his intent to repeat this
falsehood and to invent new ones, yet equity will take no jurisdiction,
for by a senile doctrine evolved centuries ago, rights of personality
will not be protected by equity, because money damages are con-
sidered to afford a complete and satisfactory remedy for any injury,
however destructive, to reputation and feelings. One is reminded of
"that chink in the common law which has been worn smooth by the
multitude of scoundrels who have escaped through it", and is inclined
to fear that equity has its similar crannies.
Two recent cases have perpetuated this survival of the Middle
Ages. In Howell v. The Bee Publishing Co. z58 N. W. (Neb.) 358
(i916), the plaintiff had in June, 1914, written a letter refusing to
become a gubernatorial candidate at the August primaries. He later
amended his purpose and sought the nomination. On August 17, the
day before the primaries, the defendant newspaper published his
June letter under the headline, "Howell will not run." Plaintiff
sought to enjoin further publication. The Nebraska state constitu-
tion provides, in part, "Every person may speak, write, or publish on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all
trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with
good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense."'
The District Court granted the injunction. With the statement that
equity would not enjoin a libel, the Supreme Court reversed this
decree, apparently believing that the reason for this rule is found in the
jealous guard kept over the freedom of the press, and that the con-
stitutional provision above quoted strengthened this reason.
In the second case, Willis v. O'Connell, 23 z Fed. (Southern Dist.,
Ala.) ioa4 (19x6), plaintiff was agent for a certain patent medicine,
of which five hundred thousand bottles were sold in one year in the
six southern states that he covered. Defendant published some
rather pungent statements, alleged to be libellous, concerning the
popularity of this remedy in the prohibition state of Alabama, and
referring specifically to its use by certain of those who had sent
"testimonials" to the maker of the medicine. The Alabama constitu-
tion contains a provision regarding libels, similar to that in Nebraska.2
Plaintiff alleged not only harm to his personal feelings and reputation,
'Constitution, Nebraska, Art. I, sec. 5.
2Constitution, Alabama (19o), Art. z, sec. 4.
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but also injury to his business through probable intimidation of those
whom he might reasonably expect to write testimonials in the future.
The court denied an injunction to restrain publication. The opinion
contains a review of the authorities, and sets forth another view as to
the reason for the rule that equity will not enjoin a libel, namely, that
to do so would be to protect interests of personality, over which
equity has no jurisdiction.
It seems that both of these cases are correct on authority, but not
upon principle. The leading case on the subject of injunction of libel
is Gee v. Pritchard,3 an English case decided in i818. Defendant was
an adopted son, and as a member of the family, plaintiff, his foster
mother, had written certain personal letters to him. Defendant now
threatened to publish these. Lord Eldon said that the case could not
be maintained on the ground of protecting plaintiff's feelings or
securing any other interest of personality, and that relief could only
be given to protect rights in property. But he held that plaintiff had
a "sufficient property in the original letters to authorize an injunc-
tion."
Let us look a little more closely at Lord Eldon's logic. Equity
normally assumes jurisdiction because there is no adequate remedy aL
law. Now, in this case what wrong could not be redressed at law?
The court says that it is the violation of the property right in the
letters, but in the light of common sense, to whom were these letters,
having no literary value, so precious that their worth as tangible
property could not be estimated and paid in money? Obviously; to
no one. But just as obviously, they were exceedingly valuable to the
plaintiff for their personal intangible associations, or for their effect
upon her reputation, and it was this value that could not be estimated
and paid in a suit at law; that is, while declaring that the property
right was the only one recognized, the court protected and compensated
the interest of personality.
Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School, in an exhaustive
article upon this subject, suggests that the reason for the conservative
wording of Eldon's opinion is that it was given at a comparatively
early date in the development of equity.4 The jurisdiction of equity
over torts was but little extended, and the right of privacy as a legal
doctrine had not been dreamed of. We now know that the field of
equity was greatly broadened during the middle of the nineteenth
century, and hence we might expect that the control of equity over
libels would expand commensurately, particularly as some dicta
had already gone farther than did the opinion in this case.6 And
indeed, in England, after a lapse of some fifty years, such development
did take place. The American cases generally attribute this exten-
sion of equitable powers to the effect of two English statutes,6 but an
32 Swanst. 402 (i8M8).
429 Harv. L. R. 64o.5See especially DuBostv. Beresford, 2 Camp. 511 (i8io). Burnetv. Chetwood,
2 Meriv. 44i (1720), and Huggonson's Case, 2 Atk. 469 (1740), also contain dicta,
but the first is clearly too broad, and the latter seems narrow and not to the point.
$Common Law Procedure Act (1854), 17 and i8 Vict., c. 125; Judicature Act
(873), 36 and 37 Viet., c. 66.
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examination of these laws fails to disclose any very definite authority
for equitable control of libels. If the broadened decisions of the
English courts are placed upon these statutes, it is because the
Chancellors availed themselves of the barest excuse to reverse an
antiquated doctrine.7
But the line of American decisions has been very different. Not
only have no courts taken a broad and just viewpoint, but many have
"gilded the lily", and have narrowed even the letter of Lord Eldon's
refined reasoning.
Before tracing the extension of the doctrine in America, we should
have clearly in mind the exact limitations of our question. The
reader will remember that the apparent doctrine of Gee v. Pritchard,
supra, was that equity could not protect the plaintiff's feelings
or secure any other interest of personality from a libel, but that relief
could be given to protect property rights. In the first place, we must
understand just what is considered a "libel"; then, must define
"interest of personality"; and lastly, must know the meaning of
"property" as equity will protect it from libel.
First: The layman's usual idea of a libel is that it is a malicious
and vicious written attack upon the character of a person. But as
covered by these cases, it seems also to include attacks on a man's
business -reputation, or upon his financial standing, upon his title to
property .or its condition or quality, or publication regarding his
private affairs. Some of these may not, technically, be libels, but as
regards the power of equity to enjoin them, they may all be classed
together under the one term.
Second: The term "interest of personality" includes any right
that pertains to the enjoyment or security of human life, and not to
the ownership of substance.8 We shall see specific examples infra.
Third: "Property" naturally covers such things as may be bought
and sold; and most if not all jurisdictions now include the right to
privacy, and a man's business standing.9 An attack on any of these
is an attack on a property right.
To return now to the American adjudications. The first case
arose in New York, and in view of the intense conservatism of that
!A short summary of the English development, as outlined in the article in 29
H. L. R. 640, may not be out of place. The next case after Gee v. Pritchard,
supra, note (3), was Dixon v. Holden, 7 Eq. 488 (1869). The court seems to have
ruled that equity would protect an interest of personality as well as a property
right. PrudentialAssur. Co. v.IKnott, io Ch. App. 142 (1874), overrules this as to
injunction of a ibel. Next, after the passageofthejudiatureAct, supra note (6),
Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D.339 (1878), established therule that injunction
would be allowed if the libel was repeated after a jury had found it libelous. The
next step was to allow injunction without first going to law, if the matter was
clearly libellous, Liverpool Ass'n v. Smith, 37 Oh. Div. 17o (1887); and now the
courts will give an injunction against a clearly proven libel, exactly as in the case
of any other tort, Walter v. Ashton (1902) 2 Ch. 262, and cases there cited.8See 37 L. R. A. 783, a valuable and oft-quoted note.9Dixon v. Holden, supra, note 7, gave the original definition of property. It has
been overruled on other points, but still seems good as to the definition. But
Donaldson v. Wright, 7 App. D. C. 45 (1895), and Edison v. Edison Chem. Co.,
128 Fed. 957 (19o4), hold that business reputation is not property.
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day, it is not surprising to find the court adhering closely to precedent.
The defendant in the suit, in revenge for discharge from plaintiff's
employ, threatened to publish a fictitious and libellous "life" of the
plaintiff. Injunction of this publication was refused, on the ground
that freedom of the press was endangered.10
It is clear of course that in this case the court has not even the thin
excuse of Lord Eldon to issue an injunction, for there is not the shadow
of a property claim here. But the court suggests that even a prop-
erty right might not be protected. Without expressly disapproving
the decision in Gee v. Pritchard, the Chancellor "doubted whether his
lordship in that case did not to some extent endanger the freedom
of the press by assuming jurisdiction of the case as a matter of
property merely, when in fact the object of complainant's bill was
* * * * to restrain the publication of a private correspondence,
as a matter of feeling only." It seems from this that the American
court did not see a clear distinction between property and personality
as subjects of equitable jurisdiction. It was explicitly recognized
that Eldon was protecting a personal interest; and the court's
objection was, not to the jurisdiction of equity over interests of
personality, but to the infringement of another carefully treasured
right.
The old English distinction does not in fact seem valid. Not only
is the publication of private letters, having no literary value,
enjoined," but equity also forbids the continuance of a nuisance
injurious to personal health or comfort,2 and the publication of
portraits,13 and the disturbance of dead bodies.14 In an extreme case,
such as the maintenance of a powder mill5 or of a rifle range' in the
neighborhood, there may be a real diminution of property value, but
in these other cases personal rights are the only ones in question.
Upon the strength of these decisions there have been strong protests
against a continuance of the attempted disjinction, 17 and recently
several well-argued cases have expressly declared the right of equity
to protect interests of personality. 8 Few of the American refusals to
'
0Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 24 (1839)..
uOriginally the publication of private letters was enjoined only if they had a
literary value. Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 515 (1842); Hoyt v.
Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 3 2o (1848). But for the extension of the doctrine
to all private letters, see among others Folsom v. March, 2 Story (U. S.) ioo
(x841); Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 2 Bush (Ky.) 480 (1867); Woolsey v. Judd, 4
Duer (N. Y.) 379 (1855); 25 Cyc. 1491.
"Injunction against the discharge of sewage, Butler v. Thomasville, 74 Ga. 570
(1885); or against the use of an unhealthy jail, Stuart v. Lasalle Co. Supers., 83
Ill. 341 (1876); or against noise which disturbs-a sick person, Dennis v. Eckhardt,
3 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 390 (1862).
13Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 280 (x894) semble; Pavesich v. New Eng. L. Ins.
CO., 122 Ga, igo (1904); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479 (19o5); Munden v.
Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652 (1911); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. (N. Y.) 290 (1893).
"This point is so well settled that it seems hardly necessary to cite cases.
See 13 Cyc. 269, note 8; also Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, io R. 1. 227 (1872).1 Daw v. Mfg. Co., 16o Pa. 479 (894).
'
6McKillop v. Taylor, 25 N. J. Eq. 139 (1874).
1737 L. R. A. 783; x6 Cyc. 120.
UVanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 9io (907); Ex parte Warfield, 4o Tex.
Crim. 413 (1899).
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enjoin a libel have been based explicitly upon this English distinc-
tion,19 and in view of the modem cases last noted, it seems doubtful
if they will be much further extended.
We may ask, then, whether the New York view has been generally
accepted. The majority of cases which have given any reason in
support of the rule under discussion, have undoubtedly advanced the
"freedom of the press" argument.2 0 A few have objected to the fact
that defendant would be deprived of what they consider his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial,21 but probably the majority of cases in
which injunction has been refused have been based solely upon
authority.22
The fact is that there are so many exceptions to the rule that a
reason consistent with all the cases cannot be formulated. For if care
for the freedom of the press is the real basis of the refusal to enjoin a
libel, it is just as seriously endangered when a property right is pro-
tected as when a mere interest of personality is concerned. Yet
Massachusetts seems to be the only jurisdiction which has consistently
refused to enjoin a libel when a property interest was injured.-
To note the most general exceptions (though none of these are
universally accepted, we must remember), when one sends out
circulars to a patentee's customers, stating that he intends to prose-
cute for violation of his own patent rights any who may deal with the
patentee, when as a matter of fact he knows that he has no such
right and no intent to prosecute, and issues the notices only for the
purpose of intimidation, equity will enjoin the issue of such circulars.Y
1"The following seem to rest principally on this distinction: Donaldson v.
Wright, supra, note 9; Singer Co. v. Domestic Co., 49 Ga. 70 (1872); Chappel v.
Stewart, 82 Md. 323 (1896); see also Citizens Co. v. Montgomery Co., 171 Fed.
553 (i9og) semble; Vassar College v. Loose Wiles Co., 197 Fed. 982 (1912).
20Montgomery, Ward Co. v. South Dakota Ass'n, i5o Fed, 413 (1907); Liversy
v. judge, 34 La. Ann. 741 (1882); Marx Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133 (1902);
Life Ass'n v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173 (x876); Lindsay & Co. v. Montana
Federation, 37 Mont. 264 (1908); Iverson v. Dilno, 44 Mont. 270 (1911); Marlin
Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384 (1902); N. Y. Juv. Soc. v. Roosevelt,
7 Daly (N. Y.) 188 (1877); Mitchel v. Grand Lodge, 121 S. W. (Tex.) 178 (I9o9).
21Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 110 Mo. 492 (1892); Baltimore L.
Ins. Co. v. Gleisner, 202 Pa. St. 386 (1902) semble.
2Francis v. Flinn, ix8 U. S. 385 (1886); Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773 (1886);
Balliet v. Cassidy, 104 Fed. 704 (1904); Baltimore Car Wheel Co. v. Bbnis, 29
Fed. 95 (1886); Christian Hospital v. Murphy, 223 Ill. 244 (r9o6); Chic. Ry. Co.
v. General Elec. Co., 74 Ill. App. 465 (1897); DeWick v. Dobson, i8 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 39 9 (1897).
"Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., iq. Mass. 69 (1873); Whitehead v.
Kitson, i9 Mass. 484 (1876); Raymond v. Russell, 143 Mass. 295 (1887);
Covel v. Chadwick, 153 Mass. 263 (1888); Finnish Temperance Soc. v. Raivaaja
Publ. Co., 219 Mass. 28 (i914).
There are various other cases which go to this Massachusetts extreme, but they
are not consistently followed in their jurisdictions. See Francis v. Flinn, supra,
note 22; Kidd v. Horry, supra, note 22; Balliet v. Cassidy, supra, note 22; Marx
Co. v. Watson, supra, note 20; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed., supra, note 2o;
Mauger v. Dick, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 132 (1878); DeWick v. Dobson, supra,
note 22; Mitchell v. Grand Lodge, supra, note 20.
24Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (1888); Lewin v. Welsbach Light Co., 8i Fed. 904
0897); Farquhar Co. v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714 (i9oo); Dittgen v.
Racine Co., 164 Fed. 85 (19o8); Electric Mfg. Co. v. Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189
Fed. 754 (ig91); Atlas Co. v. Cooper Co., 21o Fed. 347 (1913).
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So, too, where labor unions print statements or post placards to intimi-
date customers or employees of their opponents, an injunction will
be granted.2 Or where the libel tends to incite a breach of trust or
contract,2 or to interfere with the course of justice, 7 or where in a
jury trial a publication has been declared to be, and has been punished
as, a libel, and afterwards it is continued by the defendant, 8 equity
will enjoin the piblication. Some jurisdictions have gone even
further, and enjoin the use against his desire of a party's name, 2 or
publication contrary to military interests, 0 or defamation-of a man's
business.31
In view of the fact that this multitude of exceptions is constantly
increasing, it seems that the skeleton of the rule that still remains
is nearing its last resting place. Its life is lengthened because of the
unreasoning acceptance of authority by many courts. We have
already seen the three arguments usually advanced in support of the
rule, that equity cannot protect interests of personality, that the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press prevents injunction of
libels, and that the constitutional right to a jury trial raises the same
objection. We have also noted the many evasions of the rule. The
very fact that there are so many exceptions shows plainly the decay
of the doctrine, but were there no exceptions at all, it would be no
more reasonable.
Why, for instance, cannot equity protect interests of personality?
We have seen that as a matter of fact it does. The usual argument,
that money damages at law offer adequate compensation for injury to
reputation and personal comfort, can hardly be dignified with the
name of "fallacy," for there is not even a gloss of apparent reason to
protect it. The true foundation of the rule seems to be laid in
conditions that prevailed some centuries ago. Men had little reputa-
tion then, except as to their ability to handle a bow or a battle-axe,
and defamation of such reputation was avenged on the body of the
libellor. The rights contested in the courts were in regard to property
and naturally property interests seemed to the judges to be of
paramount importance. So when equity began the struggle for
power, the chancellors grasped at jurisdiction over property rights,
and left untouched the broad field of interests of personality. Juris-
25Gompers v. Bucks Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Casey v. Cincinnati Typo.
Union, 45 Fed. 135 (1891); Seattle Brewing Co. v. Hansen,,a44 Fed. ioxi (195o);
American Fed. of Labor v. Buck Stove Co., 33 App. D. C. 83 (i9o9); Beck v.
Teamster's Union, 118 Mich. 497 (1898).26Citizen's Co. v. Montgomery Co., supra, note 19; Nat'l L. Ins. Co. v. Myers,
i4o Ill. App. 392 (19o8); Mauger v. Dick, supra, note 23. Even Massachusetts,
by dictum, recognizes this exception, Boston Diatite Co. v Florence Mfg. Co.,
note 23, supra.
21Hobbs Mfg. Co. v. Gooding, 113 Fed. 615 (1902) sembk. But contra, Dailey
v. Super. Court, 112 Cal. 94 (1896).28Plint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., supra, note 2i; Baltimore L. Ins. Co.
v. Gleisner, supra, note 21.
*'Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, supra, note 18; Edison v. Edison Poly. Co., 73 N. J.
Eq. 136 (1907).
30Ex parte Vallandigham, i Wall. (U. S.) 243 (1863).
"
1Hovey v. Rubber Tip Pencil Co., 57 N. Y. 119 (1874), dicta, page 124.
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diction over personal interests is comparatively an innovation, and
even in the most liberal courts is not yet fully developed, while the
conservative are still content to administer the law of the Dark Ages.
As one writer suggests, chancery jurisdiction grew out of the faults of
the civil, and not of the criminal law, and the restriction should be to
civil, and not merely to property, rights.2
Is there any greater virtue in the theory that injunction of libels
would deprive the publisher of his constitutional right to have a jury
decide upon the legality of his act? An illustration given in a
Missouri case answers this question. Suppose that A rushes at B
waving a revolver, and loudly declaring his intent to kill B. Suppose,
too, that C seizes A, and restrains any attack upon B. Now, if A's
purpose had been carried out, he would have had the right to answer
for B's death before a jury, and perhaps could have justified the homi-
cide. Has not C, then, deprived A of his constitutional right to a
jury trial? This simply shows the absurd extreme to which the
arguments can be carried; and the same illustration, substituting
an intent to libel for the intent to kill, and a court of equity for C,
applies to the doctrine that equity ought not to restrain a libel.
The last and most generally accepted reason is that equity ought
not to restrain a libel in advance of publication because of the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. This rule was laid
down in the original New York case without any examination into its
validity, and the courts since then, while continually finding excep-
tions, have not inquired into the soundness of the doctrine. In the
days of the Stuarts and the early Hanovers the freedom of the press
was with good reason jealously guarded. But to-day the spirit of
government is wholly different, and the natural and logical view
seems to be the one advanced by Story, that th6 Constitution was
intended to guarantee only liberty to publish the truth with good
motives and for justifiable ends. It is obvious that, if we are to avoid
anarchy, there must be some check upon the press, at the least in the
form of liability to punishment after a libellous or treasonable publica-
tion; and since we must go so far, why not have a really reasonable
and effective restraint, and let the courts enjoin a wrong before it
becomes an accomplished fact?
Dean Pound in his article above referred to,1 criticizes the prevail-
ing doctrine, that equity will not enjoin a libel, and suggests four rules
the observance of which would preclude any undue exercise of censor-
ship by the courts. There should be (i) a legal cause of action for
defamation or disparagement of property, (2) a case for equity
because of the inadequacy of the legal remedy, (3) so clear a libel that
there is no substantial call for a jury trial, and (4) the entire proceed-
ing subject to review upon appeal. Under these rules the chance for
injustice would be reduced to a minimum, and there would seem to
be far less chance for abuse than under the present "liberal" doctrine.
3216 Cyc. 121.
3Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212 (1895).
142 Story, Constitution, sec. 188o.
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Perhaps no better summary of the attitude of equity, and criticism
thereof, could be made than to quote two extracts from Dean Pound's
discussion. Of the present attitude says he, "The old doctrine is
announced with conviction. But the whole spirit is rejected and in
result it is evaded. Something is found which gives the camel's nose
legitimate standing in the chancellor's tent, and the whole beast
follows to dispose of the case completely. Such devices never obtain
except when we are dealing with a moribund rule." And in criticism,
"Reading the American cases upon this point, one may recall the
words of Mr. Justice Holmes upon the subject of trespass ab initio:
'It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule than that it was laid
down in the reign of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since and
the rule simply persists in blind imitation of the past'."
"Ratio est legis anima: mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex." But
America seems to prefer "Stare decisis."
Kenneth Dayton, ' 7.
Real Property: Does Dowress Forfeit Her Rights Because She
Killed Her Husband?-On.September ig, 1913, Mrs. Emma Eversole
shot and killed her husband, Mack, seemingly as a result of his
intimacy with his divorced wife. She was given an indeterminate
sentence for manslaughter, and while in prison applied for dower
in her victim's real estate. The Kentucky court in Eversole v.
Eversole, z85 S. W. (Ky.) 487 (z916), allowed her claim. The Ken-
tucky decedent state laws make no provision for forfeiture of dower
when a wife kills her husband, and the Kentucky criminal laws
do not provide for the forfeiture of the right to inherit from the
victim as part of the punishment for murder. The court in coming
to its decision held that these statutes plainly laid down the policy
of the state in regard to murderous wives, and refused to change this
policy to suit its own ideas of right.
The question raised by the case is, shall a slayer be permitted to
make a pecuniary profit by his victim's death? This question has
been widely discussed in various legal periodicals.' The cases on
this point are hopelessly in conflict. The majority of American cases
reach the result of the principal case upon similar reasoning.2 The
British courts,3 and some few American courts,4 however, take a
contrary view. The omission of the statutes of descent and of the
'See ii Columbia L. R. 18o; 15 id. 26o; 27 Harvard L. R. 280; 9 111. L. R. 5o2;
62 Pa. L. R. 484; 63 id. 435; 3o L. Q. R. 211.2Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 18o (1914); McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533
(19o6); Gollnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349 (191o); Shellenburger v. Ransom, 41
Neb. 631 (1894); Owens v. Owens, IOO N. C. 240 (1888); Deem v. Millikin, 53
Oh. St. 668 (x895); Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okl. I (1913); DeGraffenreid v.
Iowa Co., 20 Old. 687 (1907); Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. St. 2o3 (1895);
Johnson's Estate, 29 Pa. Super. Ct. 255 (1905).3Estate of Crippen, (i911) Probate io8: Estate of Hall, (1914) Probate i;
Lundy v. Lundy, 24 Can. S. C. 650 (1895); In re Cash, 3o N. Z. L. 577 (1911).
'Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621 (i9o8); Riggs v. Palmer, ii5 N. Y. 506
(1889); Matter of Wolf, 88 Misc. (N. Y.) 433 (1914).
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criminal statutes to provide for this contingency is explained by
a "rational interpretation" 5 to be either unintentional, through a
failure to consider the contingency, or intentional but in reliance
upon the common law maxim that a man may not profit by his own
wrongdoing.6 The underlying idea in these cases seems to be a vague
impression that to allow the inheritance would be against public
policy as rewarding the evil doer. Obviously, however, forfeiture
of the profits of the crime benefits public policy only when the murder
is committed with the intent to gain such profits. When such intent
is absent, such forfeiture will have no deterring effect. Only when
the murder is committed for gain will prospective loss of such gain
dampen the criminal's ardor. It may be said that pecuniary gain
is always a motive of some weight in crimes of this character, and
that the criminal's true motives are indeterminable. In man-
slaughter cases, however, and in caseswhere themurderer immediately
commits suicide, the possibility of the pecuniary motive is clearly
eliminated. On principle, the advocates of the public policy theory
should make a distinction between such cases and those in which
pecuniary gain is either clearly or possibly a motive.7
It should be noted that in the principal case the pecuniary motive
is seemingly absent. When the slaying is done with an eye to profit,
the mind instinctively revolts at allowing the plan to succeed, and
indeed the Supreme Judge has declared that the murderer who kills
in order to gain an inheritance will not be allowed to retain its.
The weight of American authority is, however, contra.'
Cases in which the slayer profits by his crime may be classified
as to the method by which he profits. This may be by descent,
by testamentary gift, or by the proceeds of an insurance policy.
So far as public policy is concerned, no logical distinction can be
drawn between cases in which the victim died testate, and those
in which he died intestate. Obviously, the question raised in the
latter case is one of statutory interpretation. It has been suggested
that when the victim dies testate the only question is one of the
intent of the testator. Under this theory, a clause ig implied upon
the presumed intent of the testator forfeiting the gift if the beneficiary
murders the testator. 0 Yet, if the will specifically provided that
the beneficiary was to get the gift if he murdered the testator, the
question would still remain, is the will void as a matter of public
policy? And, as when the victim is intestate we seek to interpret
6See Riggs v. Palmer, supra, note 4.
For an application of this maxim in this class of cases, see Box v. Lanier, 112
Tenn. 393 (1903).7This distinction was suggested in Holloway v. McCormick, supra, note 2,
and in the Matter of Wolf, supra, note 4, but was ignored in the following cases,
Perry v. Strawbridge, supra, note 4; Johnson's Estate, supra, note 2; Box v.
Lanier, supra, note 6; Estate of Hall, supra, note 3; Lundy v. Lundy, supra,
note 3.8See Mat. 21:38; Mark L2:7; Luke 20:14.
9Wall v. Pfanschmidt, supra, note 2; McAllister v. Fair, supra, note 2; Shellen-
burger v. Ransom, supra, note 2; Deem v. Millikin, supra, note 2; Carpenter's
Estate, supra, note 2.1 See note 30 L. Q. R. 211, and 9 Ill. L. R. 502.
NOTES AND COMMENT
the statutes of descent, so now we must interpret the statute of
wills,-is omission to provide for this contingency accidental or
intentional? The question of the implied intent of the testator arises
only secondarily.
Insurance cases seem to be in a class by themselves. The courts
hold with practical unanimity that a slayer cannot recover on a policy
on his victim's life. Where the policy was taken out with the intent
to kill the insured, there is plainly fraud on the company," and if
the killing is intentional there is fraud even though the policy was
taken out in good faith." In the absence of intent to kill, there would
seem- to be no forfeiture of the proceeds of the policy."
The New York cases 14 contain a suggestion that the murderer be
allowed to inherit according to the will or the intestate laws but that
he be compelled to hold the inheritance as a trustee ex maleficio for
the benefit of those who would otherwise inherit. This suggestion,
though ingenious, has truly been said to be as much forfeiture as
though the murderer were technically deprived of his right to inherit.15
If such result is desired, it would seem better to accept avowedly
the doctrine that the murderer is barred from obtaining the fruits
of his crime.
The most satisfactory solution seems to be an express statutory
enactment preventing the slayer from profiting by the fruits of his
crime.15 This satisfies the instinctive feeling that the murderer
should not be allowed to profit by his crime, without need of a strained
statutory interpretation that verges on judicial legislation. Such
statutes should be carefully worded, since by their passage, the
legislature has plainly taken the matter under consideration, and
no stretching of the theory of "rational interpretation" can bring
about forfeiture in cases not clearly within the statute. 7
L. I. Shelley, '17.
Real Property: Easements: Acquisition by Diversion of Stream.-Is
a fee owner liable to give an irrevocable easement in his land without
his knowledge or consent, merely by adverse use for a period less than
"Prince of Wales Co. v. Palmer, 25 Beav. 605 (1858); Burt v. Union Ins. Co.!
187 U. S. 362 (1902).22Schreimer v. High Court, 35 Ill. App. 576 (i89o); Schmidt v. Northern Life,
112 Iowa 41 (19o0); Mutual Life v. Armstrong, r17 U. S. 591 (1885). As to
fraud on the company vitiating the policy, compare with Supreme Commandery
v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436 (1882), suicide; Hatch v. Mutual Life, 120 Mass. 550(1876), submission to an illegal operation; Ritter v. Mutual Life, 169 U. S. 139
(1897), suicide.
13Holdon v. Ancient Order, I59 Ill. 619 (1896).
14Riggs v. Palmer, supra, note 4; Ellerston v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149 (1896).
UWall v. Pfanschmidt, supra, note 2.
"6Such statutes exist in California, Iowa, Indiana, Tennessee, and other Ameri-
can jurisdictions.
"7Under such statutes it has been held that a person convicted of manslaughter
is not convicted of murder, Estate of Kirby, 162 Cal. 91 (1912); the widow takes
a distributive share as a matter of right and of contract, and not by inheritance,
Kuhn v. Kuhn, 125 Ia. 449 (19o4); accord, Mertes' Estate, 104 N. W. (Ind.) 753
(1914); the survivor of an estate by the entireties does not take by descent,
Beddington v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39 (I9O6).
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that required by the statute of limitations? This question was
recently raised in the case of Johnk v. Union Paczific R. Co., i57 N. W.
(Neb.) 918 (igi6). In that case a stream which for a long time had
flowed almost parallel to the defendant's tracks, was caused to leave
its old channel and flow across B's land into a ditch along the right of
way. The above described change was due partly to a ditch B had
built across his property and partly to a flood or freshet. Four years
after this change had taken place, three years of which the defendant
company was cognizant of the fact, the latter became aware that the
flow was damaging its road bed and endangering the lives .pf its
passengers. Steps were immediately taken to restore the stream to
its original channel, and hence this suit by the lower riparian owners
of the ancient watercourse to prevent such action.
The court held that an easement to have the water continue to flow
on property of the railroad was created. The basis of the decision
was that the defendant was allowed a reasonable time to stop the
new channel and prevent the creating of an easement. The jury
found against the railroad company.
At an early date the doctrine of acquiring title by prescription
became prevalent in England. At first, in order to create such a
title the adverse possession must have continued immemorially, that
is, had its commencement before the reign of Richard I. Later the
required period of adverse possession was lessened, and now it is
prescribed by statute. The courts have always held that in order to
create an easement by prescription there must be an adverse use
for the same period as that required to secure a prescriptive right
in corporeal property'; at such time a grant to continue using the
property is presumed.2
A homely example of an easement by prescription is where A crosses
B's land and continues to do so for the period prescribed in the
statute of limitations without objection from B who has knowledge
of the fact. A then obtains the right to continue to do so. A grant
of the right to cross B's property is presumed from B to A.
So if the water of a stream is diverted into an artificial channel,
and this changed condition continues for twenty years or the analog-
ous time as prescribed by the different statutes of limitations, such
stream cannot be restored to its ancient bed to the detriment of those
who formerly were lower riparian owners.3 A grant is presumed by
the parties over whose land the stream is flowing in its new course to
allow the water to continue to so flow.'
A few jurisdictions make an exception in the case of public high-
ways to the requirement that the adverse use must be for the statutory
"Sargent v. Ballord, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 251 (1830); Melon v. Whitney, Io Pick,
(Mass.) 295 (3830); Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Maine 436 (1847); Rooker v. Perkins,
I4Wis. 85 (186i); Tootle v. Clifton, 22 Ohio St. 247 (1871).
'Morse v. Wflliams, 62 Maine 445 (1874); Linen v. Maxwell, 67 N. H. 370
(1892); Daveis v. Collins, 43 Fed. Rep. 31 (189o).
3Matheson v. Ward, 24 Wash. 407 (19o); 'athewson v. Hoffman, 77 Mich.
42o (1889); Delaney v. Boston, 2 Har. (Del.) 489 (1839); Gould, Waters (3d ed.)
225; Belnap v. Trimble, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 577 (1832); Hollett v. Davis, 54 Wash.
326 (i909); Smith v. Musgove, 32 Mo. App. 241 (1888)4Supra, note 2.
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period. They hold that the right to use property as a public highway
is obtained after a term of adverse use sufficient to satisfy the jury
that the public was justified in treating the same as a public dedica-
tion. This exception is sometimes extended to streams because of
the interest which the public generally have in them.6  This exception
cannot be availed of here, however, as grounds for the decision,
because Nebraska makes no exception to the case of highways.
6
It is hard to see any reasons upon which the court in the principal
case bases its conclusion. Why should the legislature enact the law
requiring the adverse use or possession for ten years if it is only
going to be heeded at the whim of the court? It would seem that the
legislature regarded ten years as a reasonable time. In fact in a
previous Nebraska case7 the court held that an easement by prescrip-
tion could only be effected by an adverse use for ten years. The
court does not in any way distinguish the two cases. On the contrary
it appears to lay down the arbitrary rule that the defendant is given
a reasonable time to restore the stream. What consists of a reason-
able time is to be determined by the jury. The court appears to
have exceeded its authority and to have been legislating rather than
acting in a judicial capacity.
The title to real property has always been considered the most
sacred and stable part of the law. A change in title is only effected
with the utmost solemnity. Still in the Johnk case, the plaintiff
secures an easement in the defendant's land after four years of adverse
use.
It certainly is a very harsh rule and, if applied to all cases, would
keep the owner of realty constantly on his guard for fear that an ease-
ment would be secured against his property. Even the judges in the
Vermont cases" which held there was an easement created where
there had been an adverse use for eight and ten years on the ground
that the servient landowners were given a reasonable time to stop
the creation of the right, would regard the case of Johnk v. Railroad
Company with surprise, if they realized that such an uprooting of
the stability of real estate ownership would be the outcome of their
decisions.
A. A. Atwood, '17.
Sales: Judgment for the Purchase Price no Bar to Retaking Goods
in Conditional Sale.-The New York Court of Appeals in Ratchford
v. Cayuga County Cold Storage and Warehouse Co., 217 N. Y. 565
(ri96), took a stand with the minority of states that favor allow-
ing the seller of goods on a conditional sale contract to replevy
the goods after having entered judgment for the purchase price.
With all respect to the learned court, it is difficult to follow the
reasoning contained in the opinion. The court says, in part:
TFord v. Whitlock, 27 Vt. 265 (1855); Woodbury v. Short, 17 Vt. 387 (x845).6Grahan v. Flynn, 21 Neb. 229 (1887); Nelson v. Sneed, 76 Neb. 201 (19o6);
Smith v. Nofsinger, 86 Neb. 834 (1910).7Roe v. Howard County, 75 Neb. 448 (19o6).8Supra, note 5.
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"Where to inconsistent remedies, proceeding on irreconcilable claims
of right, are open to a suitor, the choice of one bars the other. But
to have that effect the remedies must be inconsistent. We find no
inconsistency here. * * * There is no inconsistency between
an attempt to get the money and a reservation of title if the attempt
is unsuccessful."
It is not the result reached by the Court of Appeals that is here
criticized, but the reasoning set forth in the opinion to sustain that
result. It is open to debate whether suit and entry of judgment
upon a debt is notsomething more serious and fraught with conse-
quences than "an attempt to get the money."
A majority of the states hold that there must be an election between
suing for the purchase price and retaking the goods upon default
in the payment of installments and that the pursuit of one remedy
bars the other.' Most contracts of this type embody a clause
permitting the vendee to declare all installments due if there is a
default in the payment of any one of them. In a large number of
cases the chattels may be in such condition, after some months of
use by the vendee, that the seller will prefer to collect the purchase
price rather than reclaim the goods and perhaps have to sell them
for what they will bring at a public sale. By the decision in the
principal case he may do both providing that his judgment for the
purchase price remains unsatisfied.
That suit for the purchase price vests the property in the vendee
is based, of course, on the theory that some consideration for the
promise to pay the price must be shown and that such consideration
necessarily is the transfer of the property to the buyer. This view
is opposed to that of the minority of states whicl hold that entry
of judgment for the price does not bar a later retaking if the judgment
cannot be collected.2  It is argued that the consideration for the
1Ala.-Davis v. Millings, 141 Ala. 378 (1904); Ark.-Butler v. Dodson, 78
Ark. 569 (19o6); Cal.-Parke & Lacy Co. v, White River Lumber Co., ioi Cal.
37 (1894); Conn.-Crompton v. Beach, 62 Conn. 25 (1892); Del.-Watertown
Steam Engine Co. v. Davis, 5 Houst. 218 (1875); D. C.-Smith v. Gilmore,
7 D. C. App. 192 (1895); Fla.-American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed
Brick Co., 56 Fla. ii6 (i9o8); Ida.-Pease v. Teller Corp., 22 Idaho 867 (1912);
Ind.-Smith v. Barber, 153 Ind. 322 (1899); Iowa-Richards v. Schreiber, 98
Iowa 422 (1896); Kan.-Moline Plow Co. v. Rodgers, 53 Kan. 743 (1894);
Mass.-Bailey v. Hervey, 135 Mass. 172 (1883); Frisch v. Wells, 200 Mass. 429
(19o8); Mich.-Butler v. Trader, 75 Mich. 295 (1889); Mo.--2oth Century
Mach. Co. v. Excelsior Springs Mineral Water and Bottling Co., 171 S. W. 944
(1914); Minn.-Skoog v. Mayer Bros. Co., 122 Minn. 209 (1913); Neb.-
Frederickson v. Schmittroth, 112 N. W. 564 (907); N. D.-Dowagiac Mfg. Co.
v. Mahon, 13 N. D. 516 (904); Ohio-Albright v. Meredith, 58 Oh. St. 194
(1898); Pa.-Seanor v. McLaughlin, i65 Pa. 150 (1894); S. C.-Standard Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Alexander, 68 S. C. 5o6 (1903); S. D.-Sioux Falls Adjustment Co.
v. Aikens, 142 N. W. 651 (1913); Tex.-Bank v. Thomas, 69 Tex. 237 (1887);
Wash.-Winton Motor*Carriage Co. v. Broadway Automobile Co., 118 Pac. 817(1911).2Fed.--Arctic Ice Mach. Co. v. Armstrong, 192 Fed. 14 (1911); Ala.-
Thomason v. Lewis, 103 Ala. 426 (1893); Ga.-Moon v. Wright, 78 S. E. 141
(1913); Mass.-Miller v. Hyde, i61 Mass. 472 (1893); Mich.-Fuller v. Byrne,
1o2 Mich. 461 (1894); Miss.-McPherson v. Acme Lumber Co., 70 Miss. 649(893); N.I.-Campbell P. P. & Mfg. Co. v. Rockaway Pub. Co., 56 N. J. L. 676
(1894); Vt.-Mathews v. Lucia, 55 Vt, 308 (1883).
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promise on the part of the vendee to pay is the verndor's promise
to convey upon payment. According to this view, then, a suit
for the price is a sort of action for specific performance, the property
in the goods remaining in the vendor until the execution is satisfied.
Another theory of the minority that has some basis is admirably
stated in Williston on Sales as follows: "The reservation of
title is for the purpose of securing the price. The transaction is in its
essence the same as a chattel mortgage given by the buyer on the
purchased property to secure the price. * * * just as the
mortgagee may sue for the price and also foreclose his mortgage
upon the property, so the seller in a conditional sale should be allowed
to sue for the price and also reclaim the property,. not as his own,
but for the purpose of foreclosing it: that is-for the purpose of
endeavoring to realize from it the full amount due him."3
In answer to this it may be said that if suit for the purchase price
is to vest the property in the vendee and the seller is to replevy and
hold it as a sort of trustee, an execution should be levied and the
property sold by the sheriff in the regular course of procedure.
Unless a new variety of lien is to be read into the law the vendor will
not be protected between the time of entry of judgment and the
replevin proceeding as against prior judgment creditors. The advant-
age of allowing retaking under such circumstances is not clear.
Furthermore it is "obvious that, if the buyer is to be considered as the
owner of the goods after entry of judgment, some provision must
exist for the buyer's protection compelling a public sale of the goods
after replevin. Only a few states at present have such statutes.
As has been said, however, not many of the minority states have
adopted this somewhat artificial view but allow the seller to retake as
his own.
The law in New York as to election of remedies has been unsettled
until the decision in the principal case. No case squarely presenting
the situation here discussed has been decided by the Court of Appeals
until the present time. The Supreme Court and the Appellate
Division have held that suit for the price bars retaking.4 It is
perhaps worthy of note that Judge Seabury concurred in the opinion
in Orcutt v. Rickenbrodt,5 which is directly contra to the opinion in
the principal case in which he also concurred.
In the states which hold that suit for the price bars retaking it
is interesting to note the variance that exists as to the exact moment
when the property is deemed to have passed to the buyer. The
commencement of the action by service of summons has been con-
sidered sufficient to vest ownership in the vendee.6 Filing a claim
'Williston on Sales, Note to Sec. 571.
'Shipley Const. & Supply Co. v. Mager, 165 App. Div. (N. Y.) 866 (1914);
Pels v. Oltarsh Iron Wks., 129 N.Y. Supp. 371 (1911); Avery v. Chapman, 127
N. Y. Supp. 721 (1911); Orcutt v. Rickenbrodt, 42 App. Div. 238 (1899);
Wright v. Pearce, 4Hun (N.Y.) 351 (1875); Kirkv. Crystal, 1I8 App. Div. (N.Y.)
32 (907), where filing of mechanics lien was held to vest property in the vendee.
542 App. Div. (N. Y.) 238 (1899).
6Alden v. Dryer, 92 Minn. 134 (1904); Orcutt v. Rickenbrodt, supra, note 3;
Avery v. Chapman, supra, note 3; Frisch v. Wells, supra, note i.
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against a decedent's estate and filing a claim in bankruptcy have had
the same result.8 Judgment is regarded as the line of demarcation in
Twentieth Century Mach. Co. v. Excelsior Springs Mineral Water
and Bottling Co.9 In some of the minority states attachment or
levy upon the goods will do that which the judgment alone will not,
namely, cause the property to pass to the buyer.'0
A somewhat bewildering discussion is found in the opinion in
Arctic Ice Machine Co. v. Armstrong County Trust Co.," in which
it is set forth that filing a mechanic's lien does not constitute an
election. The learned judge admits that to file a lien and to retake
the goods are inconsistent remedies but declares that the law will
regard the former as a "mistake" if the vendor reconsiders and
wishes to pursue his other remedy.
The outstanding fault of this branch of the law of conditional
sales, as well as of most branches of it, is its lack of uniformity.
This unfortunate state of affairs will, it is hoped, be remedied by
the proposed Uniform Conditional Sales Act drawn by Professor
Bogert of the Cornell University College of Law, which is now before
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Section
ig of the new law reads as follows: "The retaking of possession * *
shall be deemed an election by the seller to rescind the contract of
sale and the buyer shall not be liable thereafter for the price except
as provided in Section 17. The bringing of an action by the seller
for the recovery of an installment or the whole of the price shall not
be deemed inconsistent with a later retaking of the goods. * *"
As to the effect of election by the seller to retake the goods upon
the buyer's default it is generally held that such retaldng acts as a
rescission of the contract and cancels the buyer's obligation to pay
the purchase price.1
The provisions in the proposed Uniform Conditional Sales Act
would serve to clear up the present uncertainty regarding the rights
of the vendor and vendee by amply protecting the security of the
seller and at the same time preventing imposition upon the buyer.
From a comprehensive view of the large mass of authority it
seems that there was little occasion for the Court of Appeals to dis-
regard theweight of precedent indeciding the principal case. It points
out no advantage to be gained by allowing retaking after judgment.
The better rule seems to be to regard the transfers of the property
as occurring at the time of service of the summons, there being no
logical reason for considering the transfer delayed until the entry
7Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, IO9 Cal. 353 (1895).8Crompton v. Beach, supra, note i; American Process Co. v. Florida White
Pressed Brick Co., supra, note i; Smith v. Gilmore, supra, note I.
9117 S. W. (Mo.) 944 (i914).
"lThomasoft v. Lewis, supra, note 2, but see Mathews v. Lucia, supra, note 2.
n'92 Fed. I14 (1911).
uBellv.Old, 113 S.W. (Ark.) 1023 (19o8); Glissonv. Heggie, io5 Ga.30 (1898);
Turk v. Carnahan, 25 Ind. App. 125 (9oo); Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Casselius, 7
Minn. 115 (1898); Cooper v. Payne, x9o N. Y. 512 (19o6); Kelly-Springfiell
Road Roller Co. v. Schlimme, 220 Pa. 413 (1908); Stewart & Holmes Drug Co. v.
Ross, 74 Wash. 401 (1913).
NOTES AND COMMENT
of judgment. Then if no other property is available the goods can
be seized and sold under execution with no detriment, in theory at
least, to either vendor or vendee.
Donald H. Hershey, 'x8.
Trusts: Remedy of a Creditor of a Spendthrift Trust.-The case of
Jenks v. Title Guarantee and Trust Company, z7o App. Div. (N. Y.)
83o (x915), serves to recall to the attention of the bar an uncertainty
which seems to affect the law in New York pertaining to the remedy
of a creditor of a trust estate.
The trustee of the bankrupt estate of one Buchanan, for whose
benefit two spendthrift trusts had been created, brought action against
the trustee of the said trust, to reach the surplus income of the
beneficiary.
The court, Ingraham, P. J., dissenting, held that there could be a
recovery of all income over and above the amount necessary for the
suitable support of the defendant and those dependent upon him
which amount the court placed at from $9,ooo to $12,000 per year.
The important fact to be noted concerning this case is that the
court based its holding on section 98 of the New York Real Property
Law. Up to this time it had generally been thought that section 98
had been impliedly repealed by section 139I of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Section 98 of the New York Real Property Law' provides in part
that the surplus of the income from a trust estate "beyond the sum
necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary, shall be
liable to the claims of his creditors in the same manner as other
personal property which canhot be reached by execution."
Section i39i of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 19o82
provides that income from a trust estate to the amount of $12 or
more a week may be garnisheed by a judgment creditor to the extent
of ten per centum thereof. This is irrespective of whether the bene-
ficiary's income is more than sufficient to provide for his education
and support.3
In 1877 the case of Williams v. Thorn4 by judicial interpretation
made section 98 applicable to personal property; andin 1911 the United
States Bankruptcy Act was amended so as to vest trustees of bank-
rupts "with all the rights remedies and powers of a judgment creditor
holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied."5
The uncertainty which has hitherto prevailed in New York in
regard to the remedy of a trust creditor can be directly traced to the
case of Brearly School v. Ward.6 In that case an application based
on the code amendment was made and granted to garnishee the
1Consolidated Laws 19o9, chap. 5o.2A previous amendment to section 1391 of the code provided for the garnish-
ment of trust incomes to the amount of $20 or more per week. See Laws 1903,
chap. 461.
3Heppenstall v. Baudouine, 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 118 (i9ui).
47o N. Y. 270, 273 (1877).
r36 U. S. Stat. at Large 84o, see. 8 (19io).
62o N. Y. 358 (19"1).
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income of a 7estui que trust. The question before the court at that
time was whether there was a constitutional impediment in the way
of the retroactive operation of section 1391 of the code.7 The ques-
tion whether section 98 had been impliedly repealed by section 1391
was not then necessary for decision, but in an interesting dictum the
court, by Willard Bartlett, J., said8 that the exemption provided for
in section 98 "to the extent of ten per cent. of the trust income has
now been repealed by the code amendment in question."
It was this statement which caused lawyers generally to think that
section 98 had been impliedly repealed.
But a review of the cases in New York since the code amendment of
19o8 will show that section 1391 did not repeal section 98, but was
intended to be used concurrently with it.
That the Court of Appeals did not intend to convey the meaning
that section 1393 had impliedly repealed section 98 was evidenced
by the fact that a week after deciding the Brearly case the same
court held in Matter of Ungrich9 that the income of a trust estate
could be reached either by an action to impound the surplus beyond
the requirements of the beneficiary for his support or by a special
execution under section 1391 of the code.
A statement to the same effect was made by a Federal court in
In re Burtis.o
In Heppenstall v. Baudouine" it was expressly held that section
1391 of the code did not impliedly repeal section 98 but that the two
remedies are concurrent; and a recovery was accordingly permitted
under section 98
In Demuth v. Kemp 2 recovery was refused under section 98, but
this was not because section 98 was considered as repealed, but
because the plaintiff failed to show what was reasonably necessary
for the support of the judgment debtor, and therefore the court had
no evidence on which to base a finding.
On an appeal of the Demuth case 3 it was said by Stapleton, J., that
the purpose of section 1391 was to measure the quantum of the income
of the trust fund, thereby avoiding the necessity of resorting to equityjurisdiction to ascertain the surplus income. Recovery was had by
the plaintiff under section i391.
In Ellis v. Chapman"4 recovery was not allowed under section 139i
because the income under the trust fund was less than twelve dollars
a week, but it was said in the dissenting opinion of Laughlin, J., that
the purpose of section i39i was "to extend's the law in favor of judg-
ment creditors so as to reach a percentage of the income which might
be necessary for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary."
7Heppenstall v. Baudouine, supra, note 3.
"At page 364.
'2oi N. Y. 415, 419 (1911).10188 Fed. 52 (1911).
nSupfa, note 3.
12159 App. Div. (N. Y.) 422 (I913).11165 App. Div. (N. Y.) 77 (1914).
"165 App. Div. (N. Y.) 79 (1914).
uAt page 87.
NOTES AND COMMENT
To sum up then, it seems that the purpose of section i391 was not
to repeal section 98, but merely to extend the law in favor of judgment
creditors ;" to garnishee theincome of the cestui, irrespective of whether
the income was more than sufficient to provide for the debtor's
maintenance;1t in other words to avoid the necessity of resorting to
equity to ascertain the amount of such surplus.'8
There are times when the one remedy is better, and times when the
other is more desirable. For instance, in the Jenks case the beneficiary
had an income of $23,ooo. The court held that $9,000 was necessary
for the support of himself and those dependent on him.' This left
$14,ooo a year to be applied to the claims of his creditors. Had the
proceedings been under the code, the creditors would have gotten only
$2,300 a year. Suppose, on the other hand, that the beneficiary's
income had been only $9,ooo. Since this amount was necessary for
his support, his creditors would have gotten absolutely nothing under
section 98, while under section 139 1, they would have received $900.
That the two remedies are not inconsistent has already been -held.20
It is certain, however, that so important a statutory expression as
section 1391 "ought not be left obscurely contained in a long section
of the Code of Civil Procedure; '"21 nor should section 98 be left
without the addition of its complement, the code remedy.
It would seem that both sections should be repealed, and a new
section enacted to embody the expressions of both provisions as they
exist today, so that hereafter the alternative remedies may be easily
found and recognized.
Henry Klauber, 'i7.
1sSupra, note I5.
17Heppenstall v. Baudouine, supra, note 3.18Demuth v. Kemp, supra, note 13.19The determination of the amount necessary for the support of the beneficiary
is arrived at by taking into account his habits of living (Andrews v. Whitney, 82
Hun (N. Y.) 117, 123 (1894), and the locality of his residence (Tolles v. Wood,
16 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) I, 13 (1885)).2 Heppenstall v. Baudouine, supra, note 3.
"'See consolidator's note under section 98 of the N. Y. Real Property Law,
supra, note I.
